Social insurance, informality, and labor markets : how to protect workers while creating good jobs /

This volume reviews the evidence regarding the effects of social insurance and social assistance programmes on labour market outcomes and discusses options to improve their design and implementation. The book focuses particularly on middle income countries in Latin America and Asia with a large info...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Otros Autores: Frölich, Markus (Editor ), Kaplan, David (Editor ), Pagés, Carmen (Editor ), Rigolini, Jamele (Editor ), Robalino, David A. (Editor )
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2014.
Edición:First edition.
Temas:
Labor supply > Effect of income maintenance programs on.
Development economics.
Labor policy.
Marché du travail > Effets des programmes de sécurité du revenu sur.
Économie du développement.
Travail > Politique gouvernementale.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Labor.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Labor & Industrial Relations.
Development economics
Labor policy
Labor supply > Effect of income maintenance programs on
Seguretat social.
Mercat de treball.
Llibres electrònics.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Social Insurance, Informality, and Labor Markets: How to Protect Workers While Creating Good Jobs
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • Preface*
  • Assessing the Effects of Social Insurance on Labor Markets
  • Setting the Mandate of the Insurance Programs and Designing Redistributive Arrangements
  • Financing a Universal Social Insurance System
  • Conclusions
  • Have more Flexibility When Setting the Mandate, or Bundle of Benefits, of Social Insurance Programs
  • Reduce Tax-wedges
  • 1: Social Insurance, Informality, and Labor Markets: How to Protect Workers While Creating Good Jobs1.1. Introduction
  • 1.2. Conceptualizing the Links Between Social Insurance and the Labor Market
  • 1.3. Assessing the Effects of Social Insurance on Labor Markets
  • 1.4. Setting the Mandate of the Insurance Programs
  • 1.4.1. Defining the Mandate of the Social Insurance System
  • 1.4.2. Designing Redistributive Arrangements
  • 1.5. Financing a Universal Social Insurance System
  • 1.6. Concluding Remarks
  • Notes
  • References
  • Part I: Assessing the Effects of Social Insurance on Labor Markets2: The Evolution of Social Security Systems in Latin America*
  • 2.1. Introduction
  • 2.2. The Bismarckian Vision of Social Security
  • 2.3. When Did Latin America Adopt the Bismarckian Model?
  • 2.4. A Comparison Between Social Security Policy and Education Policy
  • 2.5. The Beveridge Model of Social Security
  • 2.6. Why Did Latin America Adopt the Bismarckian Model?
  • 2.7. The Expected Expansion of Coverage Never Materialized
  • 2.8. Why Has Informality Been So Persistent?
  • 2.9. The Movement Towards Parallel Non-Contributory Programs2.10. The Result of a Long Historical Process is a Poorly Designed Patchwork System of Social Security
  • 2.11. An Alternative Social Security Model Can Be Implemented
  • 2.12. Conclusions
  • Notes
  • References
  • 3: Labor Informality and the Incentive Effects of Social Protection Systems: Evidence from a Health Reform in Uruguay*
  • 3.1. Introduction
  • 3.2. The Social Protection System in Uruguay
  • 3.3. The Health Reform and its Labor Market Incentive Effects
  • 3.3.1. The 2008 Health Reform
  • 3.3.2. Health Insurance Expansion and Incentives for Formal-Sector Employment3.4. Data and Identification Strategy
  • 3.4.1. Data
  • 3.4.2. Identification Strategy
  • 3.5. Empirical Results: Incentive Effects and the Health Reform in Uruguay
  • 3.5.1. Effects at the Individual Level
  • 3.5.2. The Impact of Health Reform on Intra-Household Labor Arrangements
  • 3.6. Conclusions and Policy Discussion
  • Notes
  • References
  • 4: Effects of Non-Contributory Systems on Informality: Taking Stock of Eight Years of Implementation of Mexicoâ€?s Seguro Popular*

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