Evidence, decision, and causality /

Most philosophers agree that causal knowledge is essential to decision-making: agents should choose from the available options those that probably cause the outcomes that they want. This book argues against this theory and in favour of evidential or Bayesian decision theory, which emphasises the sym...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Ahmed, Arif
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New York : Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Temas:
Decision making.
Evidence.
Causation.
Prise de décision.
Évidence.
decision making.
PHILOSOPHY > Epistemology.
Causation
Decision making
Evidence
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover; Halftitle; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Introduction; 0.1 Causalism and evidentialism; 0.2 Evidence; 0.3 Causality; 0.4 Decision theory; 0.5 Evidential Decision Theory and Causal Decision Theory; 0.6 Predestination; 0.7 Why it matters; Chapter 1 Savage; 1.1 Simplifications and idealizations; 1.2 States, events, outcomes and acts; 1.3 Rational preference and the Savage axioms; 1.4 From preference to probability; 1.5 Utility and the representation theorem; 1.6 Dominance and fatalism; Chapter 2 EDT and CDT; 2.1 Preference over news items; 2.2 The Jeffrey-Bolker axioms
  • 2.3 Credence2.4 Evidential Decision Theory; 2.5 Newcomb's problem; 2.6 K-partitions; 2.7 Causal Decision Theory; 2.8 Matters arising; Chapter 3 Causalist objections to CDT; 3.1 Egan-Gibbard; 3.2 The Piaf maxim; 3.3 Objective Decision Theory; Chapter 4 Realistic cases; 4.1 Remedial cases; 4.2 Medical cases; 4.3 The Tickle Defence; 4.4 Economic cases; 4.5 Psychological cases; 4.6 Prisoners' Dilemma; Chapter 5 Deterministic cases; 5.1 Betting on the Past; 5.2 Betting on the Laws; 5.3 Objections; 5.4 The openness of the past; Chapter 6 Quantum-mechanical cases; 6.1 The device
  • 6.2 Identical settings6.3 Non-identical settings; 6.4 QM versus CDT; 6.5 Objections; Chapter 7 The standard Newcomb case; 7.1 Deflationary responses; 7.2 The Discontinuous Strategy; 7.3 The case for one-boxing; 7.4 The case for two-boxing; 7.5 Conclusion; Chapter 8 'The ultimate contingency'; 8.1 Dualism and the Ramsey Thesis; 8.2 Arguments for the Ramsey Thesis; 8.3 Dynamic inconsistency and Dutch books; 8.4 Anti-dualism; References; Index

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