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Evidence, decision, and causality /

Most philosophers agree that causal knowledge is essential to decision-making: agents should choose from the available options those that probably cause the outcomes that they want. This book argues against this theory and in favour of evidential or Bayesian decision theory, which emphasises the sym...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Ahmed, Arif
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New York : Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

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245 1 0 |a Evidence, decision, and causality /  |c Arif Ahmed, University of Cambridge. 
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520 |a Most philosophers agree that causal knowledge is essential to decision-making: agents should choose from the available options those that probably cause the outcomes that they want. This book argues against this theory and in favour of evidential or Bayesian decision theory, which emphasises the symptomatic value of options over their causal role. It examines a variety of settings, including economic theory, quantum mechanics and philosophical thought-experiments, where causal knowledge seems to make a practical difference. The arguments make novel use of machinery from other areas of philosophical inquiry, including first-person epistemology and the free will debate. The book also illustrates the applicability of decision theory itself to questions about the direction of time and the special epistemic status of agents. 
505 0 |a Cover; Halftitle; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Introduction; 0.1 Causalism and evidentialism; 0.2 Evidence; 0.3 Causality; 0.4 Decision theory; 0.5 Evidential Decision Theory and Causal Decision Theory; 0.6 Predestination; 0.7 Why it matters; Chapter 1 Savage; 1.1 Simplifications and idealizations; 1.2 States, events, outcomes and acts; 1.3 Rational preference and the Savage axioms; 1.4 From preference to probability; 1.5 Utility and the representation theorem; 1.6 Dominance and fatalism; Chapter 2 EDT and CDT; 2.1 Preference over news items; 2.2 The Jeffrey-Bolker axioms 
505 8 |a 2.3 Credence2.4 Evidential Decision Theory; 2.5 Newcomb's problem; 2.6 K-partitions; 2.7 Causal Decision Theory; 2.8 Matters arising; Chapter 3 Causalist objections to CDT; 3.1 Egan-Gibbard; 3.2 The Piaf maxim; 3.3 Objective Decision Theory; Chapter 4 Realistic cases; 4.1 Remedial cases; 4.2 Medical cases; 4.3 The Tickle Defence; 4.4 Economic cases; 4.5 Psychological cases; 4.6 Prisoners' Dilemma; Chapter 5 Deterministic cases; 5.1 Betting on the Past; 5.2 Betting on the Laws; 5.3 Objections; 5.4 The openness of the past; Chapter 6 Quantum-mechanical cases; 6.1 The device 
505 8 |a 6.2 Identical settings6.3 Non-identical settings; 6.4 QM versus CDT; 6.5 Objections; Chapter 7 The standard Newcomb case; 7.1 Deflationary responses; 7.2 The Discontinuous Strategy; 7.3 The case for one-boxing; 7.4 The case for two-boxing; 7.5 Conclusion; Chapter 8 'The ultimate contingency'; 8.1 Dualism and the Ramsey Thesis; 8.2 Arguments for the Ramsey Thesis; 8.3 Dynamic inconsistency and Dutch books; 8.4 Anti-dualism; References; Index 
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