Cargando…

Tax reform in rural China : revenue, resistance, and authoritarian rule /

"How does China maintain authoritarian rule while it is committed to market-oriented economic reforms? This book analyzes this puzzle by offering a systematic analysis of the central-local governmental relationship in rural China, focusing on rural taxation and political participation. Drawing...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Takeuchi, Hiroki
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a2200000 i 4500
001 EBSCO_ocn885208502
003 OCoLC
005 20231017213018.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu---unuuu
008 140804s2014 nyu ob 001 0 eng d
040 |a N$T  |b eng  |e rda  |e pn  |c N$T  |d CAMBR  |d YDXCP  |d EBLCP  |d E7B  |d DEBSZ  |d CDX  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCF  |d YDX  |d OCLCQ  |d BUF  |d UAB  |d OCLCQ  |d UKAHL  |d OL$  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO  |d K6U  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO 
019 |a 885122143  |a 964333937  |a 964550613  |a 1007072677  |a 1007510610 
020 |a 9781316004616  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 1316004619  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 9781107297883  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 1107297885  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 9781316009116 
020 |a 1316009114 
020 |z 9781107056848 
020 |z 1107056845 
020 |z 9781107699991 
020 |z 1107699991 
029 1 |a AU@  |b 000053213927 
029 1 |a DEBBG  |b BV043610095 
029 1 |a DEBSZ  |b 410550167 
029 1 |a NLGGC  |b 380190087 
035 |a (OCoLC)885208502  |z (OCoLC)885122143  |z (OCoLC)964333937  |z (OCoLC)964550613  |z (OCoLC)1007072677  |z (OCoLC)1007510610 
043 |a a-cc--- 
050 4 |a HJ1401  |b .T35 2014eb 
072 7 |a BUS  |x 051000  |2 bisacsh 
082 0 4 |a 336.2/01451  |2 23 
084 |a POL040020  |2 bisacsh 
049 |a UAMI 
100 1 |a Takeuchi, Hiroki. 
245 1 0 |a Tax reform in rural China :  |b revenue, resistance, and authoritarian rule /  |c Hiroki Takeuchi. 
264 1 |a New York, NY :  |b Cambridge University Press,  |c 2014. 
300 |a 1 online resource 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a "How does China maintain authoritarian rule while it is committed to market-oriented economic reforms? This book analyzes this puzzle by offering a systematic analysis of the central-local governmental relationship in rural China, focusing on rural taxation and political participation. Drawing on in-depth interviews with Chinese local officials and villagers, and combining them with game-theoretic analyses, it argues that the central government uses local governments as a target of blame for the problems that the central government has actually created. The most recent rural tax reforms, which began in 2000, were a conscious trade-off between fiscal crises and rural instability. For the central government, local fiscal crises and the lack of public goods in agricultural areas were less serious concerns than the heavy financial burdens imposed on farmers and the rural unrest that the predatory extractive behavior of local governments had generated in the 1990s, which threatened both economic reforms and authoritarian rule"--  |c Provided by publisher 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
505 0 |a Cover; Half title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Tables; Figures; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Introduction; 1 The Theory of Revenue and Resistance under Authoritarian Rule in Rural China; Part I Historical and Analytical Contexts; 2 Revenue and Resistance in Rural China in History; 3 Revenue and Resistance under Authoritarian Rule in Post-Mao Rural China, 1980-2005; 4 Survival Strategies of Local Governments; Part II Analytic Narratives; 5 Exit Strategies of Villagers; Appendix 5A: Formal Description and Solution to the Game of Migration and Taxation. 
505 8 |a 6 Voice Strategies of VillagersAppendix 6A: Formal Description and Solution to the Migration, Participation, Taxation Game; 7 Village Elections and Authoritarian Rule in Rural China; Appendix 7A: Formal Description and Solution to the Village Election Game; Conclusion; Appendix Empirical Sources and Methods; Appendix A: Informants; Appendix B: Interview Questions; Appendix C: Sources of the Cases on Village Elections; References; Index. 
590 |a eBooks on EBSCOhost  |b EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - Worldwide 
650 0 |a Fiscal policy  |z China. 
650 0 |a Taxation  |z China. 
650 0 |a Rural population  |z China. 
650 0 |a Rural development  |z China. 
650 6 |a Politique fiscale  |z Chine. 
650 6 |a Impôt  |z Chine. 
650 6 |a Population rurale  |z Chine. 
650 6 |a Développement rural  |z Chine. 
650 7 |a POLITICAL SCIENCE  |x Government  |x International.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS  |x Public Finance.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a Fiscal policy  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Rural development  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Rural population  |2 fast 
650 7 |a Taxation  |2 fast 
651 7 |a China  |2 fast 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Takeuchi, Hiroki.  |t Tax reform in rural China  |z 9781107056848  |w (DLC) 2014009754  |w (OCoLC)877852715 
856 4 0 |u https://ebsco.uam.elogim.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=786083  |z Texto completo 
938 |a Askews and Holts Library Services  |b ASKH  |n AH26905200 
938 |a Askews and Holts Library Services  |b ASKH  |n AH28321696 
938 |a Askews and Holts Library Services  |b ASKH  |n AH33402046 
938 |a Askews and Holts Library Services  |b ASKH  |n AH26918987 
938 |a Askews and Holts Library Services  |b ASKH  |n AH26767430 
938 |a Coutts Information Services  |b COUT  |n 28706362 
938 |a ProQuest Ebook Central  |b EBLB  |n EBL1701908 
938 |a ebrary  |b EBRY  |n ebr10904370 
938 |a EBSCOhost  |b EBSC  |n 786083 
938 |a YBP Library Services  |b YANK  |n 12009425 
938 |a YBP Library Services  |b YANK  |n 12009539 
938 |a YBP Library Services  |b YANK  |n 12023231 
938 |a YBP Library Services  |b YANK  |n 12028250 
994 |a 92  |b IZTAP