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Foreign and domestic investment in Argentina : the politics of privatized infrastructure /
This book argues that for infrastructure privatization programs, differences in firm organizational structure explain the viability of privatization contracts in weak institutional environments.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2014.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Half-title page; Title page; Copyright page; Contents; Figures and Tables; Figures; Tables; Abbreviations; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Informal Supports for Long-Term Contracts: Domestic Investors' Home Court Advantage; Additional Contributions; Research Design; A Sector Focus on Urban Water and Sanitation; Nested, Subnational Comparisons; Sources; Road Map; 1 Informal Contractual Supports in Weak Institutional Environments; The Outcomes of Interest: Resilient versus Brittle Contractual Relationships; Bilateral Bargaining in a Volatile Political Setting.
- Explaining Divergent Contractual RelationshipsInvestor Organizational Structure and Divergent Contract Trajectories; Firm Structure, Preferences, and Negotiating Tactics; Investor Organizational Structure and Embeddedness; Investor Organizational Structure and Predicted Contract Trajectories; Variation among Foreign Investors; Political Sources of Variation; Financial Resources and Changing Leverage over Time; Scope Conditions for the Argument; Alternative Explanations; Conclusion; 2 Water and Sanitation Privatization in Argentina: An Overview.
- The Setting for Privatization: A Decentralized and Deficit-Ridden SystemA Relatively Uniform Privatization Program with Partial Uptake; The "Selection Process": Investor Entry into Particular Contracts; A Broad-Brush Test of the Book's Argument in the Argentine Water Sector; Choice and Measurement of the Key Dependent and Independent Variables; Conceptualizing and Measuring Investor Organizational Structure; Conceptualizing and Measuring Investor Exit; Measuring Successfully Concluded Contract Renegotiations; Conceptualizing and Measuring Post-Crisis Rate Increases.
- Correlations between Investor Organizational Structure and Contractual OutcomesAn Initial Consideration of Alternative Explanations; Conclusion; 3 Contractual Fragility Prior to the Crisis: Investors without Diverse Local Holdings Falter; Identifying More and Less Challenging Political Environments for Infrastructure Contracts; Expectations and Measurement for Contracts in High-Hurdle Political Environments during Periods of High Investor Leverage; Foreign-Led Contracts in Provinces with High Political Hurdles; Saur's Faltering Trajectory in Mendoza Province.
- The Implosion of Azurix's Contract in Buenos Aires ProvinceThe Collapse of the Aguas del Aconquija Contract in Tucumán; Domestic Investors with and without Local Holdings in High-Hurdle Environments: The Corrientes Case; Conclusion; Chapter Appendix; Political Hurdle Index; Details; 4 Smoother Sailing for All Investors in Less Competitive Provinces; Foreign-Led Contracts in Provinces with Low to Moderate Political Hurdles; Foreign Investor Suez's Portfolio in Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Córdoba; A Smooth Start for the Foreign-Held Contract in Misiones Province.