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Game theory and mechanism design /
This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Hackensack, New Jersey :
World Scientific,
2014.
|
| Colección: | IISc lecture notes series ;
v. 4. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Dedication; Foreword; Opinions on the Book; About the Author; Preface; Acronyms; Symbols and Notations; Contents; 1. Introduction and Overview; 1.1 Game Theory: The Science of Strategic Interactions; Value of Game Theory and Mechanism Design; Game Theory: A Rich History; 1.2 Current Trends and Modern Applications; Current Trends; Some Modern Applications; 1.3 Outline of this Book; References; NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY; 2. Key Notions in Game Theory; 2.1 Strategic Form Games; 2.2 Preferences; 2.3 Utilities; 2.4 Rationality; 2.5 Intelligence; Common Knowledge; 2.6 Classification of Games.
- 2.7 Summary and ReferencesReferences; 3. Extensive Form Games; 3.1 Illustrative Examples; 3.2 Extensive Form Games: Definitions; 3.3 Transforming Extensive Form to Strategic Form; 3.4 Summary and References; References; 3.5 Exercises; 4. Strategic Form Games; 4.1 Preliminaries; 4.2 Matching Pennies with Simultaneous Moves; 4.3 Rock-Paper-Scissors Game; 4.4 BOS (Bach or Stravinsky) Game; 4.5 A Coordination Game; 4.6 Prisoner's Dilemma Game; 4.7 Company's Dilemma Game; 4.8 A Non-Symmetric Company's Dilemma Game; 4.9 A Duopoly Pricing Game; 4.10 Tragedy of the Commons.
- 4.11 Bandwidth Sharing Game4.12 A Sealed Bid Auction; 4.13 Pigou's Network Game; 4.14 Braess Paradox Game; 4.15 Summary and References; References; 4.16 Exercises; 5. Dominant Strategy Equilibria; 5.1 Strong Dominance; 5.2 Weak Dominance; 5.3 Very Weak Dominance; 5.4 Illustrations of Dominant Strategy Equilibria; 5.5 Summary and References; References; 5.6 Exercises; 6. Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria; 6.1 The Notion of Nash Equilibrium; 6.2 Illustrative Examples of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 6.3 Games without a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 6.4 Interpretations of Nash Equilibrium.
- 6.5 Existence of Multiple Nash Equilibria6.6 Maxmin Values and Minmax Values; Maxmin Value and Maxmin Strategy; Minmax Value; 6.7 Equilibria in Extensive Form Games; Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; 6.8 Summary and References; References; 6.9 Exercises; 7. Mixed Strategies and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 7.1 Mixed Strategies; 7.2 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 7.3 Properties of Mixed Strategies.
- 7.4 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Profile to be a Mixed Strategy Nash EquilibriumImplications of the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions; Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria of the BOS Game; Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria of the Coordination Game; 7.5 Maxmin Values and Minmax Values in Mixed Strategies; Maxmin Value in Mixed Strategies; Minmax Value in Mixed Strategies; 7.6 Domination in Mixed Strategies; Dominating Strategies and Dominated Strategies; Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies; 7.7 Summary and References; References; 7.8 Exercises; 8. Utility Theory.