Naturalizing epistemic virtue /
Explores virtue epistemology as naturalistic and presents new opportunities for work on epistemic abilities, epistemic virtues and cognitive character.
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autor principal: | |
Otros Autores: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
New York :
Cambridge University Press,
[2014]
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Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Half-title; Title page; Copyright information; Table of contents; Contributors; Chapter 1 Introduction; 1 Virtue epistemology: metaphysical and normative; 2 Worries about normativity: Quine and Moore; 3 Metaphysical worries: situationism and virtue epistemology; "Warrant, functions, history" by Peter J. Graham; "The epistemic 'ought'" by Ram Neta; "Naturalism and norms of inference" by Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins; "Indirect epistemic teleology explained and defended" by David Copp; "Moral virtues, epistemic virtues, and the Big Five" by Christian Miller.
- "Epistemic dexterity: a Ramseyian account of agent-based knowledge" by Abrol Fairweather and Carlos Montemayor"Re-evaluating the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology" by Duncan Pritchard; "Stereotype threat and intellectual virtue" by Mark Alfano; "Acquiring epistemic virtue: emotions, situations, and education" by Heather Battaly; "Virtue and the fitting culturing of the human critter" by David Henderson and Terence Horgan; "Expressivism and convention-relativism about epistemic discourse" by Allan Hazlett; Chapter 2 Warrant, functions, history.
- 1 Virtue epistemology and proper function2 Etiological functions; 3 Normal functioning; 4 Three functional norms; 5 Epistemic warrant as normal functioning; 6 Directional and maintenance selection; 7 Self-replication and repair; 8 Interlude on Swampman; 9 Trial-and-error learning; 10 Learning and derived functions; 11 Conclusion; Chapter 3 The epistemic "ought"; 1 Wolterstorff on the proper function ought; 2 Feldman on oughts of good credal performance; 3 Kornblith on regulative ideals of credence; 4 A more complete account of the epistemic ought; 5 Conclusion: back to "ought" and "can."
- Chapter 4 Naturalism and norms of inference1 Introduction; 2 Epistemic norms, naturally; 3 An open question argument, and related issues; 4 Epistemology of inference; 5 Concept grounding and inference; 6 The metaphysics of inference norms + the epistemology of inference; Chapter 5 Indirect epistemic teleology explained and defended; 1 Pluralist teleology; 2 Indirect epistemic teleology; 3 Locating indirect epistemic teleology; 4 Justified belief: a proposal; 5 Objections and replies; 6 Conclusion; Chapter 6 Moral virtues, epistemic virtues, and the Big Five.
- 1 The empirical adequacy of the moral and epistemic virtues2 An overview of the Big Five approach; 3 First concern: Big Five traits are only summary labels; 4 Second concern: problems for the leading causal trait model of the Big Five; 5 Third concern: the Big Five and responsibility; 6 Conclusion; Chapter 7 Epistemic dexterity; 1 Introduction: metaphysical epistemology; 2 Greco, dispositions, norms in virtue epistemology; 3 Causality: folksy, metaphysical, and psychologically constrained; 4 Success semantics: the constraints on causality and cognitive processing; 5 Objections; 6 Conclusion.