Hume's epistemology in the Treatise : a veritistic interpretation /

Frederick F. Schmitt offers a new account of Hume's epistemology in 'A Treatise of Human Nature', which alternately manifests scepticism, empiricism, and naturalism. Critics have emphasised one of these positions over the others, but Schmitt argues that they can be reconciled by traci...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Schmitt, Frederick F., 1951-
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2014.
Temas:
Hume, David, > 1711-1776 > Criticism and interpretation.
Hume, David, > 1711-1776. > Treatise of human nature.
Hume, David, > 1711-1776
Treatise of human nature (Hume, David)
Knowledge, Theory of > Early works to 1800.
Théorie de la connaissance > Ouvrages avant 1800.
PHILOSOPHY > History & Surveys > Modern.
Knowledge, Theory of
Criticism, interpretation, etc.
Early works
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • ""Cover""; ""HumeÂ?s Epistemology in the Treatise: ""; ""Copyright""; ""Dedication""; ""Acknowledgements""; ""Contents by Chapters""; ""Contents by Sections""; ""References""; ""1: The Epistemological Framework""; ""1.1 The Erosion of Knowledge in HumeÂ?s Predecessors""; ""1.2 The Epistemological Framework and its Consequences for HumeÂ?s Account of Justified Belief""; ""1.3 Constraints of the Framework and their Implications for the Account of Justified Belief""; ""1.4 What an Account of Justified Belief is""; ""1.5 Defeasible and Overall Justification""
  • 1.6 The Broader Historical Background of the Reliability Account of Justified Belief and Veritistic Epistemology1.7 Conclusion
  • Preview of the Divisions
  • DIVISION I: Knowledge, Belief, and Justification
  • Preview of Division I
  • 2: Knowledge (1.3.1)
  • 2.1 Locke on the Psychology of Knowledge
  • 2.2 Locke on the Psychology of Probability
  • 2.3 Locke on the Epistemology of Knowledge, Probability, and Certainty
  • 2.4 Locke on the Epistemology of Certainty and Evidence
  • 2.5 Locke on the Extent of Knowledge
  • 2.6 The Psychology and Extent of Knowledge
  • 2.7 The Certainty of Knowledge2.8 Infallibility
  • 2.9 The Certainty of Proofs
  • 2.10 Knowledge and Justified Belief
  • 2.11 Applying Knowledge
  • 2.12 One Reliability or Two?
  • 2.13 Conclusion
  • 3: The Natural Function of Beliefs (1.3.10)
  • 3.1 Locke on the Purpose of Judgements
  • 3.2 The Nature of Beliefs
  • 3.3 The Natural Function of Beliefs
  • 3.4 Which Perceptions are Ascribed a Natural Function?
  • 3.5 Which Natural Functions are Ascribed?
  • 3.6 Causal Inference and the Natural Function of Beliefs
  • ""3.7 The Natural Function of Beliefs and Veritistic Epistemology""""3.8 Conclusion""; ""4: Justified Belief""; ""4.1 `JustÂ? and its Cognates""; ""4.2 The Association of `JustÂ? and `TrueÂ?""; ""4.3 Other Epistemic Terms and Reliability""; ""4.4 Conclusion""; ""Summary of Division I""; ""DIVISION II: Causal Inference""; ""Preview of Division II""; ""5: Causal Inference (1.3.2, 4, and 6)""; ""5.1 From Lockean Reasoning to Humean Inference""; ""5.2 The Argument that Only Causal Inference Assures Us of Unobserved Existences (1.3.2)""
  • 5.3 The Argument that Causal Inference Must Begin with a Sense Impression (1.3.4)5.4 The Argument that Causal Inference is Not Lockean Reasoning (1.3.6)
  • 5.5 The Assumption that Causal Inference is Justifying in 1.3.6
  • 5.6 The Assumption that Causal Inference is Justifying in 1.3.6 and the Reliability Interpretation
  • 5.7 Alleged Evidence for a Sceptical Interpretation of 1.3.6
  • 5.8 The Assumption that Causal Inference is Justifying and Part 4 Scepticism
  • 5.9 Conclusion
  • 6: The Justification that Causal Inference is Justifying (1.3.8, 12, and 15)

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