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Telecommunication Network Economics : From Theory to Applications /
An up-to-date guide to the economic issues in telecommunications, delivering a comprehensive overview from mathematical models to practical applications.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2014.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Half title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; About the authors; 1 Introduction: telecommunications evolution and the set of actors; 1.1 The evolution of telecommunications and the associated economic models; 1.2 The need for modeling and analysis; 1.2.1 The tragedy of the commons; 1.2.2 The Braess paradox; 1.2.3 Spectrum auctions; 1.2.4 The network neutrality debate; 1.3 A description of the actors; 1.4 Goals of the book; 1.5 Outline of the book; 2 Mathematical foundations: optimization, game theory, auctions; 2.1 Basic economic theory; 2.1.1 Representing actor preferences.
- 2.1.2 Effect of prices on demand2.1.3 Global performance of an outcome; 2.2 Mathematical tools; 2.2.1 Continuous optimization methods; 2.2.2 Fixed-point results; 2.3 Game theory; 2.3.1 Vocabulary and definitions; 2.3.2 Non-atomic games; 2.3.3 Bayesian games; 2.3.4 Congestion games; 2.3.5 Potential games; 2.3.6 Stackelberg games; 2.3.7 Repeated games; 2.3.8 Further reading; 2.4 Mechanism design and auctions; 2.4.1 General principles and desirable properties; 2.4.2 The revelation principle; 2.4.3 Auctions: a specific type of mechanism; 2.4.4 First-price auctions; 2.4.5 Iterative open auctions.
- 2.4.6 Second-price auctions2.4.7 Revenue-equivalence results; 2.4.8 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions; 2.4.9 Combinatorial auctions; 2.4.10 Double-sided auctions; 2.4.11 Towards computational mechanism design; 2.5 Conclusion; 3 Economics of access service providers; 3.1 History and evolution of access pricing models; 3.2 Expectations of users and ISPs, impact on other actors; 3.3 Flat-rate pricing; 3.4 Volume-based pricing; 3.5 Congestion and value-based pricing; 3.5.1 Pricing and connection acceptance control; 3.5.2 Multiclass pricing; 3.5.3 Auctions.
- 3.5.4 Interference-based pricing for wireless networks3.5.5 The Kelly mechanism; 3.6 Economics of bundling; 4 Economics at the content and application level; 4.1 A bit of history; 4.2 Advertising; 4.2.1 Auctioning for advertising slots: basic principles; 4.2.2 Auctions between advertisers; 4.2.3 Extensions of the basic auction model; 4.2.4 Pay-per-click or pay-per-view?; 4.2.5 Learning; 4.2.6 Existing tools/companies; 4.3 Paid applications versus free applications with advertisements; 4.4 Economics of clouds/grids; 4.5 Economics of peer-to-peer systems.
- 4.6 Economics of content delivery networks5 Interactions among network service providers; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Auctions for wireless spectrum; 5.2.1 Why use auctions?; 5.2.2 Auction rules and evolution; 5.2.3 Evolving from simultaneous ascending auctions . . .; 5.2.4 ... to incentive auctions; 5.3 Competition between access providers; 5.3.1 Association models based on user utility; 5.3.2 Aggregated demand models; 5.3.3 Providers competing in multiple-time-scale decision games; 5.3.4 To license or not to license resources?; 5.4 Client but competitor: the (unsustainable?) situation of MVNOs.