Cargando…
Free will, agency, and meaning in life /
Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility. He argues that although we may not possess the kind of free will that is normally considered necessary for moral responsibility, this does not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents, or a robu...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Oxford :
Oxford University Press,
2014.
|
| Edición: | First edition. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Defending a source view
- Problems for event-causal and non-causal libertarianisms
- The prospects for agent-causal libertarianism
- A manipulation argument against compatibilism
- Free will skepticism and rational deliberation
- Moral responsibility without basic desert
- Free will skepticism and criminal behavior
- Personal relationships and meaning in life.