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Party system change in legislatures worldwide : moving outside the electoral arena.
How much autonomy do elected politicians have to shape and reshape the party system on their own, without the direct involvement of voters in elections?
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2013.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Contents; Figures; Tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; pt. one: The prospect of party system change between elections; 1. The phenomenon of party and party system change; 1.1. Approaches to analyzing change in parties and party systems; 1.1.1. Change in the number and position of parties as emanating from the electoral arena; 1.1.2. Change in competition for the executive; 1.1.3. New attention to change in legislative parties; 1.2. The possibility and reality of party system change between elections; 1.3. The argument in brief; 1.4. The map of the book.
- 2. How parliamentary party system change matters for policy; 2.1. Legislative coalitions and policy; 2.1.1. Legislative parties as coalitions of incumbents; 2.1.2. Legislative majority coalitions and executive coalitions; 2.1.3. The core, policy choice, and changing the status quo; 2.2. Manipulating the core: the power of interparty moves; 2.3. Tectonic shifts out of party moves: empirical illustrations; 2.3.1. Two-party system: U.S. House; 2.3.2. Two-party system: U.S. Senate; 2.3.3. Four-party system: Canadian House; 2.3.4. Five sizable and many minor parties: Italian Chamber; 2.4. Conclusion.
- 3 Why and how individual incumbents change legislative party systems; 3.1. An integrated model of inducements and deterrents to changes of affiliation among individual incumbents; 3.1.1. Inducements to changing parties in the utility functionof incumbent i; 3.1.2. The incumbent's time-contingent choice and the parliamentary cycle; 3.1.3. The electoral value of stable party labels; 3.1.4. Voters' calculus: agency risks and rewards for partisan constancy; 3.1.5. Unified analysis of the calculations of politicians and voters.
- 3.2. Testable implications: inducements, deterrents, and the timing of interparty moves; 3.3. Research design; 3.4. Conclusion
- pt. two: Discerning mechanisms through case studies; 4. Legislators' pursuit of benefits and legislative party system change; 4.1. Revisiting the parliamentary cycle; 4.1.1. Operationalizing stages of the parliamentary cycle; 4.1.2. Elaborating the hypothesis on timing moves to seize gains; 4.2. Inducements at the granular level: 1996-2001 Italy and 1993-1995 Russia; 4.2.1. Rationale for selection of two primary in-depth terms.
- 4.2.2. Variations in incumbent changes of party across aggregated stages; 4.2.3. MP interparty mobility disaggregated by substage; 4.3. Enlarging the view: MP interparty mobility by stage; 4.4. The formation of new parliamentary parties; 4.5. Conclusion; 5. Avoidance of electoral costs and stability in parliamentary parties; 5.1. Revisiting the logic on incumbent avoidance of electoral costs; 5.2. The closest scrutiny of deterrents to changing party: 1996-2001 Italy and 1993-1995 Russia; 5.2.1. A first look at the timing of interparty moves relative to elections.