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From Psychology to Neuroscience : a New Reductive Account /

This book explores the mind-body issue from both the perspectives of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Starting from the problem of mental causation, it provides an overview of the contemporary metaphysical discussion and argues in favour of the token-identity thesis, as the only positio...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Soom, Patrice
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Frankfurt ; New Brunswick : Ontos Verlag, 2011.
Colección:Epistemische Studien (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) ; Bd. 21.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION; 1.1 The mind-body problem in philosophy of mind; 1.2 The metaphysical issue of mental causation; 1.3 The epistemological reducibility of psychology; 1.4 Outline; Chapter 2 THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION; 2.1 Objects, events and properties: preliminary remarks; 2.2 Premises of the problem of mental causation; 2.3 Inconsistency of the premises; 2.4 Typology of possible positions in philosophy of mind; 2.5 Summary and transition; Chapter 3 ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM; 3.1 Classical type-identity; 3.2 Multiple realization in an ontological context.
  • 3.3 Supervenience3.4 The causal completeness: psychology and physics; 3.5 Non-reductive physicalism; 3.6 The causal argument for the token-identity thesis; 3.7 The token-identity thesis as ontological reductionism; 3.8 Summary and transition; Chapter 4 PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROSCIENCE; 4.1 General background; 4.2 Folks psychology as a functional theory of the mind; 4.3 Neuroscience; 4.4 Summary and transition; Chapter 5 EPISTEMOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM; 5.1 Why epistemological reductionism?; 5.2 Classical reductionism and the requirements of reduction.
  • 5.3 Multiple realization in an epistemological context5.4 Overcoming multiple realization; 5.5 The general dilemma of multiple realization; 5.6 Summary and transition; Chapter 6 REDUCTION BY MEANS OF FUNCTIONAL SUB-TYPES; 6.1 What should be expected from any account of epistemological reductionism?; 6.2 Starting point: an implication of multiple realization; 6.3 Reduction by means of functionally defined subtypes; 6.4 Summary and transition; Chapter 7 REDUCTION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO NEUROSCIENCE:CASES STUDIES; 7.1 How it works: guidelines to reducibility in principle.
  • 7.2 Finding critical conditions of manifestations7.3 Down to neurobiology; 7.4 Summary and transition; Chapter 8 FINAL REMARKS; 8.1 Complete reductionism; 8.2 Conservative reductionism; 8.3 Back to the mind-body problem; BIBLIOGRAPHY; INDEX.