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From Utterances to Speech Acts /
This is naturalistic theory of when, how and why our utterances are interpreted as speech acts: assertions, orders or promises.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2013.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Figures; Acknowledgements; Abbreviations; Introduction; 0.1 Motivation; 0.2 Conventional and non-conventional speech acts; 0.3 The two main ingredients of the account; 0.4 Outline of the book; 1 Austins distinctions revisited; 1.1 Austins levels of meaning and Davidsons philosophy of action; 1.2 Perlocutionary acts and causal effects; 1.3 From phatic to locutionary acts; 1.3.1 Phatic acts and semantic contents; 1.3.2 Austin on rhetic and locutionary acts; 1.3.3 Locutionary acts and propositional content; 1.4 Locutionary acts and expressions of Intentional states; 1.5 Conclusion.
- 2 Intentional states and locutionary acts2.1 Direction of fit; 2.2 De re and de dicto; 2.3 Potentiality and Intentional states; 2.4 Intentions; 2.5 Potentiality in language; 2.5.1 Updating information states; 2.5.2 A short excursus on epistemic possibility; 2.5.3 Potentiality: a property of locutionary acts; 2.5.4 Precautionary notes; 2.6 Functions in language and mind; 2.6.1 Functions: direct and derived; 2.6.2 Functions and context; 2.6.3 Locutionary and illocutionary functions; 2.7 Functional isomorphism between locutionary acts and Intentional states; 2.8 Conclusion.
- 3 Constative speech acts3.1 Influencing the addressees beliefs; 3.2 Constative speech acts as reasons to believe; 3.3 When the constative force is missing; 3.3.1 Irony; 3.3.2 Platitudes; 3.3.3 Soliloquies; 3.4 The function of constative illocutionary acts; 3.5 The contents of constative illocutionary acts; 3.5.1 Direct versus indirect; 3.5.2 Commitment to the performance versus commitment to the content; 3.6 Trust and communication; 3.7 The origins of truth-commitment; 3.8 Assertions and commitment; 3.9 Presupposition accommodation; 3.10 Conclusion; 4 Directive speech acts.
- 4.1 Against perlocutionary accounts: again4.2 Directive speech acts as reasons to act; 4.3 Directive speech acts, potentiality and possibility; 4.4 Desirability; 4.5 Indirect versus secondary directive speech acts; 4.5.1 Sentence-types and illocutionary forces; 4.5.2 Primary and indirect speech acts; 4.6 When the directive force is missing; 4.7 Conclusion; 5 Speech acts, autism spectrum disorders and typical development; 5.1 Autism spectrum disorders: pragmatics and mindreading; 5.2 Varieties of false-belief tasks; 5.3 False-belief tasks and cognitive flexibility.
- 5.4 Perspective-shifting: immature versus impaired5.4.1 Implicit belief attribution; 5.4.2 Counterfactual reasoning; 5.4.3 Pretence; 5.4.4 Joint attention; 5.5 Perspective-shifting and communication; 5.5.1 Constative speech acts; 5.5.2 Directive speech acts; 5.6 Pragmatics in ASDs; 5.7 Conclusion; 6 Commissive speech acts; 6.1 Conventions and promises; 6.2 A semantic solution?; 6.3 Explaining the commitment; 6.3.1 Commissives versus first-person directives; 6.3.2 Expression of intentions; 6.3.3 Predictions and expression of intentions; 6.3.4 Commitment; 6.4 Threats.