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Why governments and parties manipulate elections : theory, practice, and implications /
"Why do parties and governments cheat in elections they cannot lose? This book documents the widespread use of blatant and excessive manipulation of elections and explains what drives this practice. Alberto Simpser shows that, in many instances, elections are about more than winning. Electoral...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
©2013.
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| Colección: | Political economy of institutions and decisions.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- List of Figures; List of Tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction and Overview; 1.1 Overview of the Argument and Findings; The Argument in Brief: Electoral Manipulation and Information; Empirical Findings; 1.2 Ramifications of the Argument and Relation to Other Bodies of Work; The Logic of Electoral Manipulation in Authoritarian Systems; Regime Type and Electoral Manipulation; Single-Party Elections and Excessive/Blatant Manipulation; Electoral Manipulation and Popular Rebellion; Electoral Manipulation and the Choice to Hold Elections.
- The Variety of Tools of Electoral ManipulationAdditional Related Literatures; 1.3 Organization and Chapter-by-Chapter Overview; 2 Electoral Manipulation; 2.1 What Is Electoral Manipulation?; 2.2 Manipulated Elections; 2.3 A Cross-National Measure of Electoral Manipulation; Implementing a Cross-National Measure of Electoral Manipulation; Summary Measures of Electoral Manipulation; 2.4 A Snapshot of Electoral Manipulation Around the World, 1990-2007; Appendix; Additional Notes on the Data; 3 The Puzzle of Excessive and Blatant Manipulation; 3.1 Conventional Wisdoms on Electoral Manipulation.
- 3.2 The First Conventional Wisdom3.3 The Empirical Record; Electoral Manipulation and the Margin of Victory; Tight Races and Electoral Manipulation; Blatant Electoral Manipulation; 3.4 Conclusion: Patterns of Electoral Manipulation; Appendix; 4 More than Winning; 4.1 The Direct and Indirect Effects of Electoral Manipulation; Example: Electoral Manipulation and Union Acquiescence; Example: Electoral Manipulation and Bureaucratic Support; 4.2 Causal Mechanisms Driving Indirect Effects; From Expectations to Political Behavior; From Political Context to Expectations.
- A Model of Political Action under Electoral ManipulationFrom Electoral Manipulation to the Political Context; Blatant Manipulation and Popularity; The Time Dimension in the Mechanisms; Indirect Effects and the Level of Government; 4.3 Conclusion; Appendix; Generalizing the Concept of Indirect Effects; 5 The Strategic Logic of Electoral Manipulation; A Model of Party Competition with Electoral Manipulation; 5.1 Equilibrium Electoral Manipulation When Only Winning Matters; Aside: Election-Night Fraud; 5.2 Equilibrium Electoral Manipulation When More than Winning Matters.
- An Example with Specific Functional Forms5.3 Background Conditions, Over-Time Feedbacks, and Patterns of Electoral Manipulation; Institutional Setting and Excessive/Blatant Manipulation; Regime Type and Excessive/Blatant Electoral Manipulation; Feedbacks, Over-Time Dynamics, and the Excessive/Blatant Electoral Manipulation Trap; 5.4 Alternative Explanations for Excessive Electoral Manipulation; Uncertainty; Cost; The Stakes of Office; Keeping the Machine Well Oiled; 6 The Theory at Work; 6.1 Overview: Empirical Implications of the more than winning Theory.