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Insurance and behavioral economics : improving decisions in the most misunderstood industry /
"This book examines the behavior of individuals at risk, insurance industry decision makers and policy makers involved in the selling, buying, and regulating of insurance"--
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Otros Autores: | , |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2012.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Insurance and Behavioral Economics; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; Part I Contrasting Ideal and Real Worlds of Insurance; 1 Purposes of This Book; The Roots of Misunderstanding of Insurance; Comparing actual behavior with Benchmark Models; Summary; 2 An Introduction to Insurance in Practice and Theory; Four Examples of Insurance Behavior in Practice; Insurance and the U.S. Economy; The Benchmark Model of Supply; Fundamental Principles of Insurance Supply; The Law of Large Numbers, Insurance Supply, and Competitive Equilibrium; Solving Two Interrelated Problems.
- The Benchmark Model of DemandDemand for Insurance using the Expected Utility Model; Choosing Optimal Deductibles; Summary; 3 Anomalies and Rumors of Anomalies; Insurance in the Media; A Short Tour of Studies on Behavioral Models and Insurance Anomalies; The Elements of Anomaly: A Hypothetical Example; Defining Anomalies; Types of Anomalies; Demand-Side Anomalies; Supply-Side Anomalies; Summary; 4 Behavior Consistent with Benchmark Models; Relevant Assumptions for Examining Behavior; Automobile Collision Coverage; Renters' Insurance; Term-Life Insurance; Summary; Appendix to Chapter 4.
- Estimate of Voluntary Collision Purchase Using Consumer Expenditure Survey DataStep One: Estimate a premium equation using those individuals with financing.; Step Two: Use the model to predict premiums for those purchasing cars without financing.; Step Three: Compare actual and predicted premiums to infer the percentage purchasing collision coverage.; Part II Understanding Consumer and Insurer Behavior; 5 Real-World Complications; Search Costs; Mistakes and Anomalous Behavior; Information Imperfections and Asymmetry; Imperfect Information about Risk.
- Information Asymmetry and Adverse SelectionAdverse Selection in Practice; Information Imperfection and Moral Hazard; Effects of Correlated Risks on Insurance Supply; Role of Reserves in Dealing with Correlated Losses; Equilibrium of Insurance Firms and Capital Markets; Relationship to Mutual Insurance; Implications for Insurer Supply Behavior; Summary; 6 Why People Do or Do Not Demand Insurance; Prospect Theory and the Demand for Insurance; The Value Function; The Weighting Function; Explaining Insurance Anomalies by Myopic Loss Aversion; A Goal-based Model of Choice; Role of Goals and Plans.
- Taxonomy of Insurance-Related GoalsOther Behavioral Explanations; Summary; 7 Demand Anomalies; Seven Anomalies; Failure to Protect against Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events; Purchasing Insurance after a Disaster Occurs; Cancelling Insurance if There Has Been No Loss; Preferences for Policies with Rebates; Preference for Low Deductibles; Unwillingness to Make Small Claims above the Deductible; Status Quo Bias: A Natural Insurance Experiment; Insurance Markets in which Demand Differs from the Benchmark Model; Flight Insurance: Insuring Specific Risks; Rental Car Insurance.