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Aristotle on desire /
"Desire is a central concept in Aristotle's ethical and psychological works, but he does not provide us with a systematic treatment of the notion itself. This book reconstructs the account of desire latent in his various scattered remarks on the subject and analyses its role in his moral p...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge, UK ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2012.
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| Colección: | Cambridge classical studies.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Aristotle on Desire; Title; Copyright; CONTENTS; PREFACE; ABBREVIATIONS; INTRODUCTION; 1. General remarks; 2. Aristotle's desire terminology and some terms I shall leave untranslated; 3. The plan of this book; PART 1 DESIRES AND OBJECTS OF DESIRE; CHAPTER 1 THE RANGE OF STATES ARISTOTLE COUNTS AS DESIRES (OREXEIS); 1. Orexeis can be rational as well as non-rational; 2. Orexeis have a variety of 'objects', ontologically speaking; 3. Orexeis can be dispositional as well as occurrent; 4. Orexeis can be 'calm' as well as 'violent'; 5. Orexeis range over wants, hopes and idle wishes.
- ConclusionCHAPTER 2 SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT OBJECTS OF DESIRE (OREKTA) FOR ARISTOTLE; 1. What are objects of desire?; 2. Do all desires require envisaging prospects?; 3. Thought-based and phantasia-based desires; 4. Can perception envisage objects of desire, for Aristotle?; Conclusion; CHAPTER 3 DESIRE (OREXIS) AND THE GOOD; 1. De an. 3.10 on orexis and the good; 2. Two notions of 'good': broad and narrow; 3. What does Aristotle mean by 'apparent good'?; (a) EE 7.2; (b) NE 3.4; (c) Verdict; 4. What sort of error is being referred to?; Conclusion.
- PART II ARISTOTLE'S CLASSIFICATIONS OF DESIRECHAPTER 4 SPECIES OF DESIRE I : EPITHUMIA (PLEASURE-BASED DESIRE); 1. A narrow notion of epithumia; 2. A broader notion of epithumia; 3. De re and de dicto objects of epithumia; Conclusion; CHAPTER 5 SPECIES OF DESIRE II: (RETALIATORY DESIRE); 1. Thumos and anger; 2. Thumos and courage; putative broader notions of thumos; (a) The Topics on the thumoeides; (b) A possible role for thumos in courage; (c) The Politics on thumos and friendship; 3. Thumos and 'the noble' (to kalon); Conclusion.
- CHAPTER 6 SPECIES OF DESIRE III: BOULÊSIS (GOOD-BASED DESIRE)1. An outline of accounts linking boulêsis to eudaimonia; (a) An agent's conception of eudaimonia; (b) How a state such as boulêsis may be tied to an agent's conception of eudaimonia; 2. Reflective views linking boulêsis to an agent's conception of eudaimonia; (a) First problem: akrasia and idle wishes in tension; (b) Second problem: the virtuous agent; (c) Third problem: inverse akratics and enkratics; 3. The referential view that ties boulêsis to an agent's explicit conception of eudaimonia.
- 4. My non-eudaimonia-based account of the connection between boulêsis and the goodConclusion; CHAPTER 7 RATIONAL AND NON-RATIONAL DESIRE; 1. Thought-based versus non-thought-based desires; 2. Bodily versus non-bodily desires; 3. Desires that are responsive to a normative judgement versus those that are not so responsive; 4. Desires that are consequent upon deliberation versus those that are not so consequent; 5. Desires that require rationality to grasp their basic object versus those that do not so require rationality; Conclusion; Appendix: Deliberation and conscious processes.