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Epistemological disjunctivism /
Duncan Pritchard offers an account of perceptual knowledge arguing that it is paradigmatically constituted by true belief that enjoys rational support which is reflectively accessible to the agent. This resolves the issue between intermalism and externalism, and poses a radical challenge to contempo...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Oxford :
Oxford University Press,
2012.
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| Edición: | First edition. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Part One: Epistemological disjunctivism in outline: 1. Epistemological disjunctivism: a first pass; 2. Motivating epistemological disjunctivism; 3. Three prima facie problems for epistemological disjunctivism; 4. Metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism; 5. Seeing that P and knowing that P; 6. Epistemological disjunctivism and the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction; 7. Resolving the access problem.
- Part Two: Favouring versus discriminating epistemic support: introductory remarks; 1. The relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge; 2. Relevant alternatives and closure; 3. Three epistemic principles: discrimination, evidential transmission, and favouring; 4. Favouring and discriminating epistemic support; 5. Diagnosis; 6. A two-tiered relevant alternatives theory; 7. Favouring versus discriminating epistemic support and epistemological disjunctivism.
- Part Three: Radical scepticism: introductory remarks; 1. Radical scepticism; 2. Mooreanism; 3. Contemporary neo-Mooreanism; 4. A simpleminded epistemological disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism; 5. Motivating epistemological disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism; 6. Overriding versus undercutting anti-sceptical strategies; 7. Radical scepticism and quietism; 8. Knowing and saying that one knows; 9. Concluding remarks.