Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation /

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This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors'...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autores principales: Annen, Kurt, 1967- (Autor), Moers, Luc (Autor)
Autor Corporativo: International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Department
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2012.
Colección:IMF working paper ; WP/12/204.
Temas:
Economic assistance.
Aide économique.
assistance.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Economics > Macroeconomics.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Economic Conditions.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

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