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Principles of Politics : a Rational Choice Theory Guide to Politics and Social Justice.

Presents the rational choice theories of collective action and social choice, applying them to problems of public policy and social justice.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Oppenheimer, Joe
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover; Principles of Politics: A Rational Choice Theory Guide to Politics and Social Justice; Title; Copyright; Abstract; Contents; Propositions and Corollaries; Tables; Figures; Sidebars; Definitions; Preface; Overview of the Book; Acknowledgments; Introduction: Politics, Universals, Knowledge Claims, and Methods; KNOWLEDGE; The Status of the Premises: Truth; The Relationship of the Premises to the Knowledge Claim: Logical Inference; Improving Knowledge Claims; UNIVERSALS, SYNERGY, AND CONTEXT; RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: PREMISES TO UNDERSTAND POLITICS; Self-interest; Preferences.
  • Research Frontiers: Experiments, Doubts, and Ways ForwardChoice; FOR FURTHER READING; Logic, Knowledge and Truth; Philosophy of Science; Rational Choice Theory and The Nature of Politics; PART I: THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION; CHAPTER 1: Voluntary Contributions and Collective Action; PUBLIC GOODS; GAME THEORY; SHARED INTERESTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR; Prisoner Dilemma Games and Collective Action; Corollaries and Further Implications; Changing the productivity of a contribution; POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS; Transforming the Game; Rewards and Punishments; Moral Incentives.
  • Repetition of the GameRepetition and knowledge of the termination point; RESEARCH FRONTIERS: EXPERIMENTS, DOUBTS, AND WAYS FORWARD; Behavioral Evidence from Prisoner Dilemma Experiments; A Further Comment Regarding Communication; CHAPTER 2: Going Beyond the Prisoner Dilemma; COLLECTIVE ACTION BEYOND THE PRISONER DILEMMA; No Dominant Strategy; The Assurance Game; The Chicken Game; The General Case; CHAPTER 3: Collective Action Applications to and Beyond Democratic Politics; RATIONAL IGNORANCE; DOING THE RIGHT THING; BEHAVIORAL CASCADES AND POPULAR UPRISINGS.
  • COMMON-POOL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATIONBROAD VERSUS NARROW, INTENSE INTERESTS; VOTING AND THE PARADOX OF VOTING; The Instrumental Incentive to Vote; Research Frontiers: Experiments and Ways Forward
  • Voting as Expressive or Symbolic Behavior; CONCLUSIONS; FOR FURTHER READING; Prisoner Dilemma Games; Logic of Collective Action; Theory; Applications; PART II: COLLECTIVE CHOICE; CHAPTER 4: Individual to Collective Choice in One-Dimensional Politics; SIMPLE SINGLE-DIMENSIONAL ISSUES, SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS, AND MAJORITY RULE; Performance; Applications.
  • Two Party Competition in a One-dimensional Political SpaceTwo-Party Competition in a Multidimensional World; Legislative Committees and the Protection of the Status Quo; Bicameralism; Committees and the Power of the Chair; Filibusters, Structure-Induced Equilibria, and Pivotal Voting; Concluding Remarks; CHAPTER 5: Individual to Collective Choice More Generally; EXTENDING SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES TO TWO DIMENSIONS; MULTIDIMENSIONAL PREFERENCES WITH MORE THAN TWO PERSONS AND SOCIAL DECISIONS; The Pareto Set; Majority Rule; Getting Beyond Simple Majority Rule; RESEARCH FRONTIERS: WAYS FORWARD.