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Epistemic Game Theory : Reasoning and Choice.
The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2012.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Epistemic Game Theory; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Figures; Tables; Acknowledgments; 1: Introduction; Part I: Standard beliefs in static games; 2: Belief in the opponents' rationality; 2.1 Beliefs about the opponent's choice; 2.2 Utility functions; 2.3 More than two players; 2.4 Choosing rationally; 2.5 Strictly dominated choices; 2.6 Belief in the opponents' rationality; 2.7 Graphical method; 2.8 Algorithm; 2.9 Proofs; Practical problems; 2.1 Where to locate a supermarket?; 2.2 Preparing for a piano exam; 2.3 Competition between two cinemas; 2.4 Going to a party.
- 2.5 The three barkeepers2.6 A game of cards; 2.7 The big race; Theoretical problems; 2.8 Domination by undominated choices; 2.9 Guaranteeing an expected utility level; 2.10 Zero-sum games; Literature; Early days of game theory; Choices; Beliefs and expected utility; Players as decision makers under uncertainty; Choosing rationally; Randomized choices; Characterization of rational choices; Belief in the opponents' rationality; Belief and knowledge; Examples and problems; 3: Common belief in rationality; 3.1 Beliefs about the opponents' beliefs; 3.2 Belief hierarchies; 3.3 Epistemic model.
- 3.4 Common belief in rationality3.5 Graphical method; 3.6 Existence; 3.7 Algorithm; 3.8 Order independence; 3.9 Proofs; Practical problems; 3.1 Where to locate a supermarket?; 3.2 Preparing for a piano exam; 3.3 Competition between two cinemas; 3.4 Going to a party; 3.5 A game of cards; 3.6 Snow White and the seven dwarfs; 3.7 The mother-in-law; Theoretical problems; 3.8 Properties of common belief in rationality; 3.9 Best-response sets; 3.10 Maximal number of steps in the algorithm; Literature; Belief hierarchies and types; Alternative ways of describing belief hierarchies.
- Common knowledge and common beliefCommon belief in rationality; Independent beliefs; Common prior; Probability 1 beliefs; Best-response sets; Large epistemic models; Finite belief hierarchies; The number machine; 4: Simple belief hierarchies; 4.1 Simple belief hierarchies; 4.2 Nash equilibrium; 4.3 Computational method; 4.4 Belief that opponents hold correct beliefs; 4.5 Proofs; Practical problems; 4.1 Black or white?; 4.2 At the gambling table; 4.3 To which pub shall I go?; 4.4 Summer holiday; 4.5 Playing hide-and-seek; 4.7 A high-school reunion; Theoretical problems.
- 4.8 Games with two players and two choices4.9 Zero-sum games; 4.10 Nash equilibrium versus Nash choice; Literature; Nash equilibrium; Interpretation of Nash equilibrium; Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in two-player games; Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium with more than two players; Correct beliefs; Existence of Nash equilibrium; Nash choice versus Nash equilibrium; Part II: Lexicographic beliefs in static games; 5: Primary belief in the opponent's rationality; 5.1 Cautious reasoning about the opponent; 5.2 Lexicographic beliefs; 5.3 Belief hierarchies and types.