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Evolution and Rationality : Decisions, Co-operation and Strategic Behaviour.
This volume explores from several viewpoints the relationship between Darwinian evolution and the theory of rational choice.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2012.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; EVOLUTION AND RATIONALITY; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures and Tables; Contributors; Introduction; CHAPTER 1: Towards a Darwinian theory of decision making: Games and the biological roots of behavior; 1.1 INTRODUCTION; 1.2 A BIOLOGIST'S LOOK AT THE STRUGGLE FOR CONCEPTS IN CLASSICAL GAME THEORY; 1.3 GAME THEORY IN REAL LIFE; 1.4 T HE POWER OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS IN BIOLOGY; 1.5 GAMES IN THE ANIMAL WORLD: DOES SUBGAME PERFECTION HAVE A CHANCE?; 1.6 A CONCLUDING REMARK ON LEARNING AND THE HUMAN ANIMAL; REFERENCES.
- CHAPTER 2: What do humans maximize?: Claire El Mouden, Maxwell Burton-Chellew, Andy Gardner and Stuart A. West2.1 INTRODUCTION; 2.2 WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF ADAPTATION?; 2.3 ADAPTATION DOES NOT IMPLY PERFECT ION OR OPTIMALITY; 2.4 WHAT DOES EVOLUTIONARY THEORY PREDIC THUMANS WILL MAXIMIZE?; 2.5 WHY DO OUR ACTIONS SOMETIME APPEAR NOT TO MAXIMIZE INCLUSIVE FITNESS (OR ANY THING ELSE)?; 2.6 IS MEASURABLY OPTIMAL BEHAVIOUR EVER EXPECTED?; 2.7 CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 3: Natural selection and rational decisions; 3.1 INTRODUCTION; 3.1.1 Energy and handling time; 3.1.2 Mean and variance.
- 3.1.3 Energy and predation riskIntegrative approaches; One dimension at a time; 3.2 INTRANSITIVITY AS AN UNSELECTED CONSEQUENCE; 3.3 MODELS OF OPTIMAL BEHAVIOUR IN WHICH TRANSITIVITY IS VIOL ATED; 3.3.1 Options are linked; 3.3.2 State-dependent behaviour; 3.4 DISCUSSION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 4: Evolution, dynamics and rationality: The limits of ESS methodology; 4.1 INTRODUCTION; 4.2 ESS AND ESS METHODOLOGY; 4.3 EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENTS; 4.4 NON-ESS STATES; 4.5 EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES; 4.6 ESS, EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENTS AND ADYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE; REFERENCES.
- CHAPTER 5: Are rational actor models "rational" outside small worlds?5.1 INTRODUCTION; 5.2 UNCERTAINTY IN INDUCTIVE INFERENCE; Stochasticity; Underspecification; 5.2.3: Further uncertainties; 5.3 FROM ERROR TO OPTIMALITY; 5.3.2: The relationship between bias, variance, and optimality; 5.4 FROM SMALL WORLDS TO LARGE WORLDS; 5.4.1 Distinguishing relative from absolute function; 5.4.2 Relative functioning in large worlds; 5.5 HOW TO CONFRONT LARGE WORLDS; 5.5.1 Making inferences with simple heuristics; 5.5.2 The bias/variance dilemma in large worlds; 5.5.3 Understanding large worlds.
- 5.6 ARERATIONAL ACTOR MODELS "RATIONAL" OUTSIDE SMALL WORLDS?REFERENCES; CHAPTER 6: Pull, push or both?: Indirect evolution in economics and beyond; 6.1 INTRODUCTION; 6.2 A LITTLE HISTORY OF THOUGHT; 6.3 INDIRECT EVOLUTION AS AN INTEGRATED APPROACH; 6.3.1 Direct evolution in the 'trust interaction'; 6.3.2 Indirect evolution of preferences and the game of trust; Imperfect 'type information'; Piercing the veil of privacy of type information; 6.3.3 Some general characteristics of indirect preference evolution; The ultimate criterion of success need not be represented in preferences.