Aristotle's Ethics and Moral Responsibility.

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Echeñique discusses Aristotle's views on moral agency and voluntariness and presents a theory of moral responsibility both original and compelling.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Echeñique, Javier
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Temas:
Aristotle. > Nicomachean ethics. > English.
Nicomachean ethics (Aristotle)
Ethics, Ancient.
Morale ancienne.
PHILOSOPHY > History & Surveys > Ancient & Classical.
PHILOSOPHY > Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
Ethics, Ancient
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover; ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY; Title; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgements; Abbreviations of Aristotle's texts; Introduction; A. REPUTABLE OPINIONS; B. CONDITIONS OF ETHICAL ASCRIPTION AND THE NEGATIVE METHOD; C. DEFEATERS OF ETHICAL ASCRIPTION; PART I Towards an account of ethical ascription; CHAPTER 1 Against the Strawsonian interpretation; A. VOLUNTARINESS, PRAISE AND BLAME; B. THE STRAWSON-INSPIRED INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE; [I] Aristotelian praise and blame as S-reactive attitudes; [II] Aristotelian recipients of praise and blame as accountable agents.
  • [III] Aristotelian praise and blame as non-prospective attitudesC. SETTING THE STAGE; D. PRAISE AND BLAME AS INVOLVED IN MORAL EDUCATION; E. MORALITY OF CHARACTER TRAITS; F. ARISTOTELIAN PRAISE AND BLAME AS LOGOI; G. ARISTOTELIAN PRAISE AND BLAME AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL; H. ARGUMENT FROM SKILLS; CHAPTER 2 Aristotle on ethical ascription; A. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ATTRIBUTABILITY; B. PUBLIC BLAME AND ARISTOTLES OWN VERSION OF ATTRIBUTABILITY; C. QUESTION ABOUT ARISTOTLES CONCERN WITH VOLUNTARINESS: FOCAL AND DERIVATIVE PRAISE AND BLAME; D. APT OBSERVER STANCE; E. REASON-RESPONSIVENESS.
  • F. CONCLUDING REMARKSPART II TThe defeaters of ethical ascription; CHAPTER 3 THE DEFINITIONS OF VIOLENCE; A. ETHICA EUDEMIA ON VIOLENCE; B. PAIN AND THE CONTRARIETY CONDITION; C. CONTINENCE, INCONTINENCE AND THE EXTERNALITY PROBLEM; D. CONTINENCE, INCONTINENCE AND THE PAIN PROBLEM; E. SOLVING THE PAIN PROBLEM: MORAL PAIN AND CONTRARIETY TO REASON; F. CORE DEFINITION OF VIOLENCE; G. PROBLEM OF HOMONYMY; H. GORGIAS' CHALLENGE; CHAPTER 4 Coercion as justification and excuse I: the Ethica Eudemia; A. NON-SUBSTANTIVE COERCION AND ITS TWO VARIETIES; B. ETHICA EUDEMIA ON OBJECTIVE RATIONAL COERCION.
  • C. OBJECTIVELY OVERWHELMING COERCIOND. OBJECTIVELY OVERWHELMING COERCION AND WHAT DEPENDS ON ONE; CHAPTER 5 Coercion as justification and excuse II: the Ethica Nicomachea; A. ETHICA NICOMACHEA ON OBJECTIVE RATIONAL COERCION; B. PRINCIPLE OF PREFERENCE; C. OBJECTIVELY OVERWHELMING COERCION AND MATRICIDE; CHAPTER 6 Factual error and the source of blame; A. GENERAL ACCOUNT OF FACTUAL UNAWARENESS; B. ACTION-DESCRIPTIONS AND THE PRIMACY CLAIM; C. CULPABLE ERROR; D. ETHICA EUDEMIA II 9; E. ETHICA NICOMACHEA III 1 AND 5; F. CONCLUDING REMARKS; CHAPTER 7 The pain condition.
  • A. PAIN CONDITION AND THE INVOLUNTARYB. REFINING OUR ACCOUNT OF THE PAIN CONDITION; C. MORAL PLEASURE AND PAIN; D. ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MORAL AVERSION- AND COMPLIANCE-ATTITUDES; E. THE COMPATIBILITY TEST; Conclusion; APPENDIX Two lexical ambiguities in Aristotles use of 'to eph' hautô[i]'; Bibliography; Index.

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