Free will and consciousness : a determinist account of the illusion of free will /

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This book argues two main things: The first is that there is no such thing as free will-at least not in the sense most ordinary folk take to be central or fundamental; the second is that the strong and pervasive belief in free will can be accounted for through a careful analysis of our phenomenology...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Caruso, Gregg D.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Lanham, Md. : Lexington Books, c2012.
Temas:
Free will and determinism.
Consciousness.
Phenomenology.
Personal Autonomy
Consciousness
Libre arbitre et déterminisme.
Conscience.
Phénoménologie.
phenomenology.
PHILOSOPHY > Free Will & Determinism.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Intro
  • Acknowledgments
  • 1 The Problem of Free Will: A Brief Introduction and Outline of Position
  • 1.1 Hard-Enough Determinism and the Illusion of Free Will
  • 1.2 Freedom and Determinism: Defining the Problem
  • 1.3 A Word About Moral Responsibility
  • Notes
  • 2 Against Libertarianism
  • 2.1 Agent-Causal Accounts of Free Will
  • 2.2 The Problem of Mental Causation
  • 2.3 Naturalized Libertarianism: Is Anyone Up For a Role of the Dice?
  • Notes
  • 3 Against Compatibilism
  • 3.1 Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument
  • 3.2 The Folk Psychology of Free Will
  • 3.3 The Phenomenology of Freedom
  • Notes
  • 4 Consciousness and Free Will (I): Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious
  • 4.1 Is Consciousness Necessary for Free Will?
  • 4.2 Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious
  • 4.3 The Unbearable Automaticity of Being
  • 4.4 Implications for Free Will
  • Notes
  • 5 Consciousness and Free Will (II): Transparency, Infallibility, and the Higher-Order Thought Theory
  • 5.1 Consciousness and Freedom: The Introspective Argument for Free Will
  • 5.2 Two Concepts of Consciousness
  • 5.3 The Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory of Consciousness
  • 5.4 Misrepresentation and Confabulation
  • 5.5 What the HOT Theory Tells Us About Free Will
  • 5.6 On the Function of Consciousness
  • Notes
  • 6 Consciousness and Free Will (III): Intentional States, Spontaneity, and Action Initiation
  • 6.1 The Apparent Spontaneity of Intentional States
  • 6.2 The Asymmetry Between Intentional States and Sensory States
  • 6.3 Do Our Conscious Intentions Cause Our Actions?
  • 6.4 Libet's Findings and the HOT Theory
  • 6.5 Explaining the Phenomenological Illusion
  • 6.6 Wegner's Theory of Apparent Mental Causation
  • Notes
  • 7 Consciousness and Free Will (IV): Self-Consciousness and Our Sense of Agency
  • 7.1 When Self-Consciousness Breaks Down.
  • 7.2 Self-Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts
  • 7.3 Errors of Identification, Thought Insertion, and the HOT Theory
  • 7.4 Accounting for Our Sense of Agency
  • 7.5 Conclusion
  • Notes
  • Works Cited
  • Index
  • About the Author.

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