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Free will and consciousness : a determinist account of the illusion of free will /

This book argues two main things: The first is that there is no such thing as free will-at least not in the sense most ordinary folk take to be central or fundamental; the second is that the strong and pervasive belief in free will can be accounted for through a careful analysis of our phenomenology...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Caruso, Gregg D.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Lanham, Md. : Lexington Books, c2012.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

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100 1 |a Caruso, Gregg D. 
245 1 0 |a Free will and consciousness :  |b a determinist account of the illusion of free will /  |c Gregg D. Caruso. 
260 |a Lanham, Md. :  |b Lexington Books,  |c c2012. 
300 |a 1 online resource (viii, 301 p.) 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
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347 |a data file 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
588 |a Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed. 
505 0 |a Intro -- Acknowledgments -- 1 The Problem of Free Will: A Brief Introduction and Outline of Position -- 1.1 Hard-Enough Determinism and the Illusion of Free Will -- 1.2 Freedom and Determinism: Defining the Problem -- 1.3 A Word About Moral Responsibility -- Notes -- 2 Against Libertarianism -- 2.1 Agent-Causal Accounts of Free Will -- 2.2 The Problem of Mental Causation -- 2.3 Naturalized Libertarianism: Is Anyone Up For a Role of the Dice? -- Notes -- 3 Against Compatibilism -- 3.1 Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument -- 3.2 The Folk Psychology of Free Will -- 3.3 The Phenomenology of Freedom -- Notes -- 4 Consciousness and Free Will (I): Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious -- 4.1 Is Consciousness Necessary for Free Will? -- 4.2 Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious -- 4.3 The Unbearable Automaticity of Being -- 4.4 Implications for Free Will -- Notes -- 5 Consciousness and Free Will (II): Transparency, Infallibility, and the Higher-Order Thought Theory -- 5.1 Consciousness and Freedom: The Introspective Argument for Free Will -- 5.2 Two Concepts of Consciousness -- 5.3 The Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory of Consciousness -- 5.4 Misrepresentation and Confabulation -- 5.5 What the HOT Theory Tells Us About Free Will -- 5.6 On the Function of Consciousness -- Notes -- 6 Consciousness and Free Will (III): Intentional States, Spontaneity, and Action Initiation -- 6.1 The Apparent Spontaneity of Intentional States -- 6.2 The Asymmetry Between Intentional States and Sensory States -- 6.3 Do Our Conscious Intentions Cause Our Actions? -- 6.4 Libet's Findings and the HOT Theory -- 6.5 Explaining the Phenomenological Illusion -- 6.6 Wegner's Theory of Apparent Mental Causation -- Notes -- 7 Consciousness and Free Will (IV): Self-Consciousness and Our Sense of Agency -- 7.1 When Self-Consciousness Breaks Down. 
505 8 |a 7.2 Self-Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts -- 7.3 Errors of Identification, Thought Insertion, and the HOT Theory -- 7.4 Accounting for Our Sense of Agency -- 7.5 Conclusion -- Notes -- Works Cited -- Index -- About the Author. 
520 |a This book argues two main things: The first is that there is no such thing as free will-at least not in the sense most ordinary folk take to be central or fundamental; the second is that the strong and pervasive belief in free will can be accounted for through a careful analysis of our phenomenology and a proper theoretical understanding of consciousness. 
546 |a English. 
590 |a eBooks on EBSCOhost  |b EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - Worldwide 
650 0 |a Free will and determinism. 
650 0 |a Consciousness. 
650 0 |a Phenomenology. 
650 2 |a Personal Autonomy 
650 2 |a Consciousness 
650 6 |a Libre arbitre et déterminisme. 
650 6 |a Conscience. 
650 6 |a Phénoménologie. 
650 7 |a phenomenology.  |2 aat 
650 7 |a PHILOSOPHY  |x Free Will & Determinism.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a Consciousness.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00875441 
650 7 |a Free will and determinism.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00933968 
650 7 |a Phenomenology.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01060522 
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