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Moral hazard : does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders? /

"The argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported programs try to contain the total economic costs of financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater willingness of creditors...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autores principales: Lane, Timothy D. (Timothy David), 1955- (Autor), Phillips, Steven, 1961- (Autor)
Autor Corporativo: International Monetary Fund. External Relations Department
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2002.
Colección:Economic issues (International Monetary Fund) ; 28.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

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