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Moral hazard : does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders? /
"The argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported programs try to contain the total economic costs of financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater willingness of creditors...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Autor Corporativo: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
2002.
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| Colección: | Economic issues (International Monetary Fund) ;
28. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
| Sumario: | "The argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported programs try to contain the total economic costs of financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater willingness of creditors and debtors to take risks of such crises - is, in principle, an unavoidable consequence. But the key question, rather than a matter of presence or absence, is the degree of moral hazard. The most basic evidence, even in the case of countries that are supposed to be too big to fail, refutes the most extreme hypothesis - that investors believe they have a full guarantee from the IMF in the event of a financial crisis."--Preface. |
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| Notas: | Guillermo and Michèle de la Dehesa Legacy Collection. "This Economic Issue is based on IMF Working Paper WP/00/168, 'Does IMF financing result in moral hazard?', October 2000"--Page iii. |
| Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (v, 15 pages) : illustrations. |
| Bibliografía: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: | 9781451935219 1451935218 1462318975 9781462318971 1452700923 9781452700922 1455294314 9781455294312 145270192X 9781452701929 |
| ISSN: | 1020-5098 ; |