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The Basic Minimum : a Welfarist Approach.
Offers a sustained defense of the claim that the basic social minimum should be characterized in terms of human welfare.
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2012.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; THE BASIC MINIMUM; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Introduction; 0.1. QUESTIONS; 0.2. ANSWERS; 0.3. LIMITS; 0.4. POLITICS AND NEUTRALITY; CHAPTER 1: On the concept (and some conceptions) of the basic minimum; 1.1. THE CONCEPT OF A BASIC MINIMUM; 1.2. CONCEPTIONS; 1.3. GOODS AND RESOURCES; 1.4. SUBSISTENCE; 1.5. SOCIAL NEEDS; 1.6. BASIC NEEDS; 1.7. CAPABILITIES; 1.7.1. No Trade-offs; 1.7.2. Expansive List, human dignity, and upward distribution; 1.7.3. Capabilities Not Welfare; 1.8. THE WELFARIST'S DILEMMA; 1.9. CONCLUSION; CHAPTER 2: A welfarist basic minimum.
- 2.1. THE DIVERSITY OF WELFARE2.2. A DISTINCTION IN GOODS; 2.3. WHAT IS A PROJECT?; 2.4. THESIS: TWO ARGUMENTS; 2.4.1. A bare intuition; 2.4.2. Shape, meaning, and self-direction; 2.5. WHAT IS A VALUED PROJECT?; 2.6. THE BASIC MINIMUM; 2.7. OBJECTION: DIGNITY AND CAPABILITIES; 2.8. OBJECTION: AUTONOMY; 2.9. OBJECTION: TOO LOW, PART ONE; 2.9.1. WBM, basic needs, and basic capabilities; 2.9.2. Reconsidering Sarah; 2.10. CONCLUSION AND THEORIES OF WELL-BEING; CHAPTER 3: Adaptive preferences; 3.1. NUSSBAUM ON ADAPTATION; 3.2. ADAPTIVE PREFERENCES AND WELL-BEING; 3.2.1. Preference for the worse.
- 3.2.2. Adaptation and autonomy3.2.3. Adaptation and proto-autonomy; 3.3. CONCEPTIONS OF THE GOOD: A THEORY; 3.3.1. Beliefs not desires; 3.3.2. Coherence and completeness; 3.3.3. Some comparisons; 3.4. COHERENTISM AND ADAPTATION; 3.5. TOO LOW, PART TWO: DEEP ADAPTATION ANDPREFERENCE FOR THE WORSE; 3.5.1. Preference for the worse and content-based assessment; 3.5.2. Preference for the worse and no content-based assessment; 3.6. CONCLUSION; CHAPTER 4: The intrinsic value of the basic minimum; 4.1. THE BASIC MINIMUM AS OVERRIDING; 4.1.1. Guarantee; 4.1.2. Maximize; 4.2. STRATEGY.
- 4.3. THE BASIC MINIMUM AND SUB-MINIMUM GOODS4.3.1. Sub-minimum goods: satisfactions; 4.3.2. Sub-minimum goods: marginal, unvalued project-improvements; 4.4. LEXICAL; 4.5. TWO OBJECTIONS TO LEXICAL; 4.5.1. The sequence; 4.5.2. A distributive objection and varieties of lexical dominance; 4.6. SUPER-MINIMUM GOODS: A SIMPLE SOLUTION; 4.7. ALTERNATIVES TO PRIORITARIANESQUE; 4.7.1. Neutrality; 4.7.2. Egalitarianism; 4.7.3. Leximin; 4.7.4. Crispian sufficientarianism; 4.7.5. Prioritarianesque as Solution; 4.8. CONCLUSION; CHAPTER 5: Against rights; 5.1. THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW; 5.2. INTRODUCING RIGHTS.
- 5.3. BENEFIT RIGHTS5.3.1. Standard threats; 5.3.2. Practicalities; 5.3.3. A general argument against benefit rights; 5.3.4. Parsimony Reconsidered; 5.4. RIGHTS: AN ECUMENICAL COMMENT; 5.5. HONORING AND OTHER MORAL STANCES: SOMESCHEMATIC COMMENTS; 5.6. CONCLUSION; CHAPTER 6: On objections to welfarism; 6.1. EXPENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE TASTES; 6.2. IMPRUDENT CHOICES AND OFFENSIVE TASTESRECONSIDERED; 6.3. WELFARISM AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS; 6.4. THE CASH COMPENSATION ARGUMENT; 6.5. OPERATIONALISM, PUBLICITY, ANDAN ECUMENICAL PROPOSAL; 6.6. RISK; 6.7. CONCLUSION, AND UNFINISHED BUSINESS; Bibliography.