Military threats : the costs of coercion and the price of peace /

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Is military power central in determining which states get their voice heard? Must states run a high risk of war to communicate credible intent? In this book, Slantchev shows that states can often obtain concessions without incurring higher risks when they use military threats. Unlike diplomatic form...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Slantchev, Branislav L., 1973-
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge, UK ; New York, N.Y. : Cambridge University Press, ©2011.
Temas:
Deterrence (Strategy)
Military policy.
Peace-building.
Diplomatic negotiations in international disputes.
Dissuasion (Stratégie)
Politique militaire.
Consolidation de la paix.
Négociations diplomatiques dans les conflits internationaux.
HISTORY > Military > Nuclear Warfare.
Diplomatic negotiations in international disputes
Military policy
Peace-building
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Part I. Coercion and Credibility: 1. Introduction; 2. Commitment and signalling in coercive bargaining; Part II. A Theory of Military Threats: 3. A model of military threats; 4. Comparing the instruments of coercion; Part III. Elements of Militarized Deterrence: 5. Militarization and the distribution of power and interests; 6. The expansion of the Korean War, 1950; 7. The price of peace and military threat effectiveness; Part IV. Conclusions: 8. Implications; Appendix A. Formalities for Chapter 2; Appendix B. Formalities for Chapter 3; Appendix C. Formalities for Chapter 4; Appendix D. Formalities for Chapter 5.

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