The nature and authority of precedent /
Neil Duxbury examines how precedents constrain legal decision-makers and how legal decision-makers relax and avoid those constraints. There is no single principle or theory which explains the authority of precedent but rather a number of arguments which raise rebuttable presumptions in favour of pre...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autor principal: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2008.
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Colección: | Cambridge books online.
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Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Sumario: | Neil Duxbury examines how precedents constrain legal decision-makers and how legal decision-makers relax and avoid those constraints. There is no single principle or theory which explains the authority of precedent but rather a number of arguments which raise rebuttable presumptions in favour of precedent-following. This book examines the force and the limitations of these arguments and shows that although the principal requirement of the doctrine of precedent is that courts respect earlier judicial decisions on materially identical facts, the doctrine also requires courts to depart from such decisions when following them would perpetuate legal error or injustice. Not only do judicial precedents not 'bind' judges in the classical-positivist sense, but, were they to do so, they would be ill suited to common-law decision-making. Combining historical inquiry and philosophical analysis, this book will assist anyone seeking to understand how precedent operates as a common-law doctrine. |
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Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (xv, 189 pages) |
Bibliografía: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
ISBN: | 9780511394843 0511394845 9780511818684 0511818688 0511393423 9780511393426 1107186587 9781107186583 1281370576 9781281370570 9786611370572 6611370579 0511394195 9780511394195 0511392117 9780511392115 0511390882 9780511390883 |