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Evidence, explanation, and realism : essays in the philosophy of science /
The essays in this volume address three fundamental questions in the philosophy of science: What is required for some fact to be evidence for a scientific hypothesis? What does it mean to say that a scientist or a theory explains a phenomenon? Should scientific theories that postulate "unobserv...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Oxford ; New York :
Oxford University Press,
2010.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Introduction
- Part I: Evidence and induction
- Concepts of evidence
- Why philosophical theories of evidence are (and ought to be) ignored by scientists
- The grue paradox
- The war on induction
- Waves and the scientific method
- Part II: Explanation
- An illocutionary theory of explanation
- The pragmatic character of explanation
- Can there be a model of explanation?
- Explanation vs. prediction : which carries more weight?
- Function statements
- Part III: Realism, molecules, and electrons
- Is there a valid experimental argument for scientific realism?
- Jean Perrin and molecular reality
- The problem of theoretical terms
- What to do if you want to defend a theory you can't prove : a method of physical speculation
- Who really discovered the electron?