A long-run collaboration on long-run games /

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This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring th...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Otros Autores: Fudenberg, Drew, Levine, David K.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Singapore ; Hackensack, NJ : World Scientific, ©2009.
Temas:
Game theory.
Théorie des jeux.
MATHEMATICS > Game Theory.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Acknowledgments; CONTENTS; Introduction; Understanding Dynamic Games: Limits, Continuity, and Robustness; Reputation Effects; Repeated Games; Private Information; Long Run and Short Run Players; References; I. Limits, Continuity and Robustness; 1. Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games D. Fudenberg and D.K. Levine; 2. Limit Games and Limit Equilibria D. Fudenberg and D.K. Levine; 3. Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players D. Fudenberg and D.K. Levine
  • 4. Finite Player Approximations to a Continuum of Players D. Fudenberg and D.K. Levine5. On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements D. Fudenberg, D.M. Kreps and D.K. Levine; 6. When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? D. Fudenberg, D.K. Levine and W. Pesendorfer; II. Reputation Effects; 7. Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player D. Fudenberg and D.K. Levine; 8. Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed D. Fudenberg and D.K. Levine
  • 9. Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent M. Celentani, D. Fudenberg, D.K. Levine and W. Pesendorfer10. When is Reputation Bad? J. Ely, D. Fudenberg and D.K. Levine; III. Repeated Games; 11. The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin; 12. The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information D. Fudenberg, D.K. Levine and E. Maskin; 13. Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players D. Fudenberg and D.K. Levine
  • 14. An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information D. Fudenberg and D.K. Levine15. The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games D. Fudenberg and D.K. Levine; 16. Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players are Patient D. Fudenberg, D.K. Levine and S. Takahashi; 17. Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring D. Fudenberg and D.K. Levine; Erratum

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