Voting for policy, not parties : how voters compensate for power sharing /

This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Voters, Orit Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects the path set by political institutions leading from votes to policy. Under this framework, the more institutional mechanisms fa...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Kedar, Orit
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Colección:Cambridge studies in comparative politics.
Temas:
Voting.
Political parties.
Political planning.
Representative government and representation.
Public opinion.
Comparative government.
Vote.
Politique publique.
Gouvernement représentatif.
Opinion publique.
voting.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Political Process > General.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Political Process > Elections.
Comparative government
Political parties
Political planning
Public opinion
Representative government and representation
Voting
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Voting for policy. Introduction: institutional sources of voter choice ; A theory of compensatory vote
  • Empirical evidence: how voters compensate for diffusion of power. Compensatory vote in parliamentary democracies ; Balancing strong (and weak) presidents ; Compensatory vote in federations: evidence from Germany
  • Theoretical implications.

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