The political economy of trade, aid and foreign investment policies /

While considerable progress has been made in analyzing the formulation of international economic policies, the existing literature remains deficient in several respects. First, the existing models take a relatively simplistic view of the political-economy environment. For example, in contrast to the...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Otros Autores: Mitra, Devashish, Panagariya, Arvind
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Boston : Elsevier, 2004.
Edición:1st ed.
Temas:
Commercial policy.
International economic relations.
Politique commerciale.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > International > General.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > International > Economics.
Commercial policy
International economic relations
Auėnhandel
Handelspolitik
Aufgabensammlung.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Contents
  • Foreword
  • Preface
  • Contributors
  • Chapter 1. Introduction
  • 1.1 Part I
  • 1.2 Part II
  • 1.3 Part III
  • 1.4 Part IV
  • References
  • Part I: Making of Trade Policy: Theory
  • Chapter 2. Trade Policy Making by an Assembly
  • 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 A specific-factors model
  • 2.3 A Mayer-Heckscher-Ohlin Model
  • 2.4 The electoral college
  • 2.5 Conclusions and open questions
  • Acknowledgements
  • References
  • Chapter 3. Should Policy Makers be Concerned About Adjustment Costs?
  • 3.1 Introduction
  • 3.2 The model
  • 3.3 Aggregate adjustment costs
  • 3.4 Adjustment costs and labor market flexibility
  • 3.5 Conclusion
  • Acknowledgements
  • Appendix A
  • Appendix B
  • Appendix C
  • References
  • Chapter 4. Non-Tariff Barriers as a Test of Political Economy Theories
  • 4.1 Introduction
  • 4.2 Developing testable implications of the theory
  • 4.3 Empirical evidence
  • 4.4 Alternative explanations
  • 4.5 Conclusion
  • Acknowledgements
  • References
  • Chapter 5. The Peculiar Political Economy of NAFTA: Complexity, Uncertainty and Footloose Policy Preferences
  • 5.1 The fact: footloose aggregate preferences on NAFTA
  • 5.2 Policy complexity, social learning and footloose preferences
  • 5.3 An illustrative model
  • 5.4 Conclusion: on economists as participants in the politics of trade policy
  • Acknowledgements
  • References
  • Part II: Making of Trade Policy: Empirical Analysis
  • Chapter 6. Interest and Ideology in the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act: A Bayesian Multivariate Probit Analysis
  • 6.1 Introduction
  • 6.2 Background: the Trade Omnibus Act
  • 6.3 Analysis of the multivariate probit model
  • 6.4 Theory and measurement
  • 6.5 Data
  • 6.6 Empirical analysis
  • 6.7 Model comparisons: Ideology versus interest
  • 6.8 Conclusion
  • Acknowledgements
  • Appendix A: Bayesian analysis of the multivariate probit model
  • References
  • Chapter 7. Industry and Factor Linkages Between Lobby Groups
  • 7.1 Introduction
  • 7.2 Theory
  • 7.3 Empirical analysis
  • 7.4 Conclusion
  • References
  • Chapter 8. Sweetening the Pot: How American Sugar Buys Protection
  • 8.1 Introduction
  • 8.2 The US sugar program
  • 8.3 Consequences of the program
  • 8.4 Sugar interest groups' contributions
  • 8.5 Determinants of sugar's campaign contributions
  • 8.6 Marginal effects of different attributes on the probability of getting money and the amount of money received by incumbent senators
  • 8.7 Concluding remarks
  • Acknowledgements
  • References
  • Part III: Inter-Country Interactions
  • Chapter 9. Unilateralism in Trade Policy: A Survey of Alternative Political-Economy Approaches
  • 9.1 Introduction
  • 9.2 Models of reciprocated unilateralism
  • 9.3 Models of endogenous unilateralism
  • 9.4 Concluding remarks: the current state of the literature and issues for future research
  • References
  • Chapter 10. Trade Creation and Residual Quota Protection in a Free Trade Area.

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