Causing actions /
Paul Pietroski defends a dualist view of the mind-body problem. Central to his account is his proposed treatment of ceteris paribus laws, their role in explanation, and how such laws are related to singular causal claims.
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autor principal: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Oxford ; New York :
Oxford Univ. Press,
©2000.
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Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Introduction
- 1. Actions as inner causes
- 2. Fregean innocence
- 3. From explanation to causation
- 4. Other things being equal
- 5. Personal dualism
- 6. Modal concerns
- 7. Natural causes
- Appendix: The semantic wages of neuralism
- References
- Index.