Plural and conflicting values /

Plural values and conflicting values are often held to be conceptually problematic, threatening the very possibility of ethics, or at least of rational ethics. Arguing against this view, this treatise shows that plurality and conflict are commonplace features of everyday choice and action.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Stocker, Michael (Michael Adam Gerber)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Oxford : New York : Clarendon Press ; Oxford Univ. Press, ©1990.
Temas:
Ethics.
Values.
Ethics
Morale.
Valeurs (Philosophie)
ethics (philosophy)
PHILOSOPHY > Social.
PHILOSOPHY > Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Acknowledgements
  • Summary Table of Con tents
  • Contents
  • Introduction
  • PART I: CONFLICT
  • 1. Dirty Hands and Ordinary Life
  • 1: Some structures of overall, action-guiding evaluations
  • 2: Some foundational features of choice and action
  • 3: How are these costs taken up?
  • 4: The special moral nature of dirty features
  • 5: Some features of dirty hands and similar acts
  • 6: Strange theories of value and the denial of dirty hands
  • 7: Moral emotions and dirty hands
  • 8: Dirty hands and acceptable moral theories
  • 2. Moral Immorality
  • 1: Admirable immorality, an introduction2: Overridingness and admirable immorality
  • 3: Overvaluing and admirability
  • 4: The unavoidable evils in admirable immorality
  • 5: Conclusion
  • 3. Dirty Hands and Conflicts of Values and of Desires in Aristotle's Ethics
  • 1: Dirty hands: A brief characterization
  • 2: That Aristotle allows for dirty hands
  • 3: Eudaimonia: The implications of mixed actions
  • 4: Acting for eudaimonia and for eudaimonia
  • 5: Conflicts of values and of desires, and Aristotle
  • 6: Conflicts of desire in Aristotle
  • 7: Some comments on Aristotelian pleasures and conflicts8: Courage and pleasure
  • 9: Conclusion
  • 4. Moral Conflicts: What They Are and What They Show
  • 1: The incompossibility account and modifications
  • 2: Conflicts of prima facie duties and of overall duties
  • 3: The shared assumption that ethics is action-guiding
  • 4: Non-action-guiding act evaluations
  • 5: Why there are non-action-guiding act evaluations
  • 6: Non-action-guiding act evaluations and ethics
  • 7: Conflicts and non-action-guiding act evaluations
  • 8: Other conflicts
  • ""9: The real importance of conflicts for ethical theory""""PART II: PLURALITY AND JUDGEMENT""; ""5. Courage, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Possibility of Evaluative and Emotional Coherence""; ""1: Courage and the Doctrine""; ""2: The meanâ€?of courage and more generally""; ""3: One value, many values""; ""4: The mean of courage""; ""5: Real unities""; ""6: Real unities and the usefulness of the Doctrine""; ""7: Complex unities""; ""Appendix 1: Pears's solution""; ""Appendix 2: The object of tharsos""; ""6. Plurality and Choice""; ""1: Three marks of plurality""
  • 2: Obvious plurality and its denial3: A confusion of commensurability and comparability
  • 4: Choice and plurality
  • 5: Against these being evaluative differences
  • 6: Pluralism and an aesthetic of pleasure
  • 7: Pluralism and pleasure as more usually considered
  • 8: No special theory of judgement for plurality
  • 9: Simplicity
  • 10: Other understandings of monism
  • 11: Difficulties with sortal comparisons
  • 12: Conclusion
  • PART III: PLURALITY AND CONFLICT
  • 7. Akrasia: The Unity of the Good, Commensurability, and Comparability

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