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Conflict, negotiation and European Union enlargement /
Each wave of expansion of the European Union has led to political tensions and conflict. Existing members fear their membership privileges will diminish and candidates are loath to concede the expected benefits of membership. Despite these conflicts, enlargement has always succeeded - so why does th...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2009.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
| Sumario: | Each wave of expansion of the European Union has led to political tensions and conflict. Existing members fear their membership privileges will diminish and candidates are loath to concede the expected benefits of membership. Despite these conflicts, enlargement has always succeeded - so why does the EU continue to admit new states even though current members might lose from their accession? Combining political economy logic with statistical and case study analyses, Christina J. Schneider argues that the dominant theories of EU enlargement ignore how EU members and applicant states negotiate the distribution of enlargement benefits and costs. She explains that EU enlargement happens despite distributional conflicts if the overall gains of enlargement are redistributed from the relative winners among existing members and applicants to the relative losers. If the overall gains from enlargement are sufficiently great, a redistribution of these gains will compensate losers, making enlargement attractive for all states. |
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| Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (xvi, 211 pages) : illustrations |
| Bibliografía: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 189-204) and index. |
| ISBN: | 0511464517 9780511464515 9780511465253 0511465254 9780511462948 0511462948 9780511575235 0511575238 1107190312 9781107190313 1281982679 9781281982674 9786611982676 6611982671 0511462182 9780511462184 0511463731 9780511463730 |