Cargando…
Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review /
In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2007.
|
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- pt. I. Introduction. An old chestnut is actually two ; Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation ; Functions and institutions
- pt. II. Majoritarian democracy and minoritarian constitutionalism. Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights ; Judicial review as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy ; Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism
- pt. III. From majoritarian to deliberative theories of constitutional democracy. Deliberative democracy: four axes of analysis ; Constitutionalism: four central elements ; Constitutional democracy?
- pt. IV. Deliberative democracy and substantive constitutionalism. Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism ; Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle ; Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating?
- pt. V. Disagreement and the constitution of democracy. Democratic precommitment to judicial review: Freeman ; Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review: Waldron ; Upshot: we need a theory of democratic constitutionalism
- pt. VI. The seducements of juristic discourse as democratic deliberation. A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation? ; Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication ; Legal principles and moral-political reasoning
- pt. VII. Constitutionalism as the procedural structuring of deliberative democracy. A provisional summary: criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review ; Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas
- pt. VIII. The institutions of constitutional review I: design problems and judicial review. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review ; Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system
- pt. IX. The Institutions of constitutional review II: horizontal dispersal and vertical empowerment. Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies ; Mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal ; Easing formal amendability requirements ; Establishing civic constitutional fora.