Delegation and agency in international organizations /

Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracie...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Otros Autores: Hawkins, Darren G., 1966- (Editor )
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Colección:Political economy of institutions and decisions.
Temas:
International organization.
International agencies.
International relations.
Delegation of authority.
International Agencies
Organisation internationale.
Délégation des pouvoirs (Gestion)
Relations internationales.
Organisations internationales.
international organizations.
international relations.
POLITICAL SCIENCE > Public Affairs & Administration.
Belangenbehartiging.
Delegatie.
Internationale organisaties.
Agency theorie.
International organizations.
States.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal agent theory / Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney
  • Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits
  • Who delegates? : alternative models of principals in development aid / Mona Lyne, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney
  • US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy / J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes
  • Why multilateralism? : foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems / Helen V. Milner
  • Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations : the case of IMF conditionality / Lisa L. Martin
  • Delegation and discretion in the European Union / Mark A. Pollack
  • Variation in agent preferences, legitimacy, tasks, and permeability
  • How agents matter / Darren G. Hawkins and Wade Jacoby
  • Screening power : international organizations as informative agents / Alexander Thompson
  • Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? : staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO / Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson
  • Delegating IMF conditionality : understanding variations in control and conformity / Erica R. Gould
  • Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power / Karen J. Alter
  • Directions for future research
  • The logic of delegation to international organizations / David A. Lake and Mathew D. McCubbins.

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