Delegation and agency in international organizations /
Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracie...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Otros Autores: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2006.
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Colección: | Political economy of institutions and decisions.
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Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Sumario: | Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracies are very similar to those faced in domestic politics. |
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Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (xvi, 406 pages) : illustrations |
Bibliografía: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
ISBN: | 0511250118 9780511250118 9780511261039 0511261039 9780511250620 0511250622 9780511249051 0511249055 9786610702701 6610702705 9780511491368 0511491360 1107168546 9781107168541 1280702702 9781280702709 0511318812 9780511318818 |