Conceptual atomism and the computational theory of mind : a defense of content-internalism and semantic externalism /

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"In the first half of Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind, John-Michael Kuczynski argues that these implausible but widely held views are direct consequences of a popular doctrine known as content-externalism, this being the view that the contents of one's mental states...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Kuczynski, John-Michael
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Amsterdam ; Philadelphia : John Benjamins Pub., ©2007.
Colección:Advances in consciousness research ; v. 69.
Temas:
Philosophy of mind.
Knowledge, Theory of.
Cognitive science.
Atomism.
Internalism (Theory of knowledge)
Externalism (Philosophy of mind)
First philosophy.
Metaphysics.
Concept Formation
Metaphysics
Cognitive Science
Knowledge
Psychological Theory
Philosophie de l'esprit.
Théorie de la connaissance.
Sciences cognitives.
Atomisme.
Internalisme (Philosophie de l'esprit)
Externalisme (Philosophie de l'esprit)
Métaphysique.
epistemology.
metaphysics.
PHILOSOPHY > Mind & Body.
Filosofie van de geest.
Cognitie.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Introduction.
  • Part I : A defense of content-internalism and a descriptivist theory of concepts. Basic concepts
  • The predicative nature of sense-perception
  • Uniquely individuating descriptions
  • Some semantic consequences or our analysis: Tokens versus types, semantics versus pre-semantics
  • Modality, intensionality, and a posteriori necessity
  • Cognitive maps and causal connections: Why the causal story is an important part of the descriptive story
  • Concepts as knowledge of series of interlocking existence-claims
  • The problem of de re senses
  • Publicity problems and the nature of linguistic communication
  • Content-externalism and self-knowledge
  • Why one's mental content is fixed by one's epistemic situation
  • Jackson and Pettit on program-causality and content-externalism.
  • Part II : Fodor, Conceptual Atomism, and Computationalism
  • Content-externalism and atomism
  • The concept of a symbol
  • Event-causation and the root-problem with CTM
  • Fodor's first argument for conceptual atomism
  • Fodor's second argument for conceptual atomism
  • Fodor's third argument for conceptual atomism
  • Some arguments for the Symbolic Conception of Thought
  • A positive argument against SCT
  • Another argument against LOT: The concept of non-conceptual content
  • Propositional structure and the ineliminability of non-conceptual content
  • Conceptual content and the structure of the proposition
  • Peacocke on concept-possession
  • Semantics versus psychology
  • Conclusion.

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