Gödel, Putnam, and functionalism : a new reading of Representation and reality /

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The first systematic examination of Hilary Putnam's arguments against computational functionalism challenges each of Putnam's main arguments.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Buechner, Jeff
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, [2008]
Temas:
Gödel, Kurt.
Putnam, Hilary. > Representation and reality.
Gödel > Kurt.
Putnam > Hilary > Representation and reality.
Putnam, Hilary.
Realism.
Functionalism (Psychology)
Mind-brain identity theory.
Computers.
Electronic digital computers.
Réalisme.
Fonctionnalisme (Psychologie)
Théorie de l'identité de l'esprit et du cerveau.
Ordinateurs.
computers.
PHILOSOPHY > Mind & Body.
PHILOSOPHY/General
COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • 1. Putnam's use of Goedel's incompleteness theorems to refute computational functionalism
  • 2. Putnam's bombshell : the Goedelian argument in "reflexive reflections"
  • 3. Universal realization of computation : Putnam's triviality argument
  • 4. Putnam's triviality theorem and universal physical computation
  • 5. Searle on triviality and the subjective nature of computation
  • 6. There are infinitely many computational realizations of an arbitrary intentional state
  • 7. Against local computational reduction : the Equivalence argument
  • 8. Rational interpretation, synonymy determination, and Equivalence
  • 9. The question of the nonformalizability of SD, coreferentiality decisions, and the family of notions : rational interpretation, general intelligence, and reasonable reasoning.

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