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Legislative leviathan : party government in the House /
The second edition of Legislative Leviathan provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Re-evaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins view parties in the House - especially majority parties...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2007.
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| Edición: | 2nd ed. |
| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- 1 The Weakness of Parties 2
- 2 Committee Government 9
- 3 An Outline of the Book 13
- Part 1 The Autonomy and Distinctiveness of Committees 15
- 1 Self-Selection and the Subgovernment Thesis 17
- 1 Self Selection 19
- 2 Constituency Interests and Assignment Requests 21
- 3 Accommodation of Assignment Requests 25
- 4 Accommodation of Transfer Requests 32
- 5 The Routinization of the Assignment Process 37
- 6 What of Norms in the Assignment Process? 39
- 7 Whither Assignment Routines? The Republican Revolution 40
- 2 The Seniority System in Congress 43
- 1 Seniority in the Rayburn House: The Standard View 44
- 2 Reconsidering the Standard View 45
- 3 The Empirical Evidence 47
- 4 Interpreting the Evidence: Postwar Democratic Rule 52
- 5 Interpreting the Evidence: The Republican Revolution 55
- 3 Subgovernments and the Representativeness of Committees 58
- 1 The Previous Literature 59
- 2 Data and Methodology 65
- 3 Results 68
- 4 The Representativeness Thesis 72
- Part 2 A Theory of Organization 77
- 4 Institutions as Solutions to Collective Dilemmas 79
- 1 Collective Dilemmas 80
- 2 Central Authority: The Basics 84
- 3 Why Central Authority Is Sometimes Necessary 87
- 4 Multiperiod Considerations 92
- 5 Problems with Central Authority 94
- 5 A Theory of Legislative Parties 99
- 1 The Reelection Goal 100
- 2 Reelection Maximizers and Electoral Inefficiencies 112
- 3 Party Leadership 115
- 4 Some Criticisms of Our Theory and Our Rejoinder 123
- Part 3 Parties as Floor-Voting Coalitions 127
- 6 On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress 129
- 1 Party Voting: Trends Since 1980 130
- 2 Party Voting: Trends from 1910 to the 1970s 131
- 3 Party Agendas and Party Leadership Votes 135
- Part 4 Parties as Procedural Coalitions: Committee Appointments 149
- 7 Party Loyalty and Committee Assignments 153
- 1 Assignments to Control Committees 154
- 2 Party Loyalty and Transfers to House Committees 155
- 3 Loyalty, the Republican Revolution, and the Great Purge of 1995 170
- 4 Assignment Success of Freshmen 171
- 8 Contingents and Parties 176
- 1 A Model of Partisan Selection 177
- 2 Which Committees' Contingents Will Be Representative? 178
- 3 Results 188
- Part 5 Parties as Procedural Coalitions: The Scheduling Power 211
- 9 The Majority Party and the Legislative Agenda 213
- 1 The Speaker's Collective Scheduling Problem 215
- 2 Limits on the Scheduling Power 217
- 3 Committee Agendas and the Speaker 221
- 4 Intercommittee Logrolls 227
- 5 Coalitional Stability 230
- 6 Critiques and Rejoinders 232
- 10 Controlling the Legislative Agenda 235
- 1 The Majority Party and the Committee System 236
- 2 The Consequences of Structural Power: The Legislative Agenda 241
- 3 The Consequences of Structural Power: Public Policy 250
- 4 Comments on the Postwar House 251
- Appendix 1 Uncompensated Seniority Violations, Eightieth through Hundredth Congresses 259
- Appendix 2 A Model of the Speaker's Scheduling Preferences 263
- Appendix 3 Unchallengeable and Challengeable Vetoes 267
- Appendix 4 The Scheduling Power 269.