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Designing federalism : a theory of self-sustainable federal institutions /
The authors argue that rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy jurisdictions, a number of institutional variables not normally associated with federal design (the content of regional charters and the extent to which public offices are filled by election rather than appointment) can...
| Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Otros Autores: | , |
| Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
New York :
Cambridge University Press,
©2004.
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| Temas: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
| Sumario: | The authors argue that rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy jurisdictions, a number of institutional variables not normally associated with federal design (the content of regional charters and the extent to which public offices are filled by election rather than appointment) can be critical to determining federal success. |
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| Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (xii, 384 pages) : illustrations |
| Bibliografía: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 0511184611 9780511184611 0511186312 9780511186318 |