Rational herds : economic models of social learning /

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This book is the first in the exciting new field of social learning.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Chamley, Christophe
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, ©2004.
Temas:
Social learning.
Social learning > Mathematical models.
Decision making.
Collective behavior.
Decision Making
Mass Behavior
Apprentissage social.
Apprentissage social > Modèles mathématiques.
Prise de décision.
Comportement collectif.
decision making.
SOCIAL SCIENCE > General.
Soziales Lernen
Kollektives Verhalten
Mathematisches Modell
Sociaal leren.
Wiskundige modellen.
Aprendizagem social.
Aprendizagem social (modelos matemáticos)
Tomada de decisão.
Comportamento coletivo.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • 1. Introduction
  • Part I. Social learning : 2. Bayesian tools : The bayesian framework ; Binary and Gaussian information ; Private signals and beliefs ; Martingales
  • 3. Social learning with a common memory : A canonical model of social learning ; Efficient learning ; Observation noise ; Extensions
  • 4. Cascades and herds : The basic model of herding ; The standard model with bounded beliefs ; The convergence of beliefs ; Herds and the slow convergence of beliefs ; Pricing the informational externality ; Crashes and booms
  • 5. Limited memories : The sequential model with sampling ; The welfare-improving principle ; Sampling in a very large population ; Social learning or sampling in a large population?
  • 6. Delays : The simplest model ; A general model with heterogeneous beliefs ; Properties
  • 7. More delays : The length of a period ; Continuous times ; Buildup of private information ; Observation of payoffs
  • 8. Outcomes : Incomplete learning ; The determinant of economic success: luck or effort? ; Complete learning with a diversity of private beliefs
  • 9. Networks and diffusion : Optimization and diffusion of innovations ; Learning in networks
  • 10. Words : Advice by one expert ; Larger sets of states and messages ; Panel of experts ; The receiver does not make the evaluation
  • Part II. Coordination : 11. Guessing to coordinate : Overview ; Eductive stability in a standard market ; Strategic complementarities ; Speculative attacks against a fixed exchange rate
  • 12. Learning to coordinate : A distribution with a cluster ; Observation noise
  • 13. Delays and payoff externalities : Strategic substitutability ; Strategic complementaries
  • Part III. Financial herding : 14.l Sequences of financial trades : Learning in the model of Glosten and Milgrom ; Herds ; Avalanches ; Herding in auctions
  • 15. Gaussian financial markets : Actions in the CARA-Gauss model ; Markets ; The convergence of beliefs ; Multiple equilibria, crashes, and booms
  • 16. Financial frenzies : Speculative attacks against a fixed exchange rate ; Information delays in financial markets ; The crash of a bubble.

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