Law and governance in postnational Europe : compliance beyond the nation-state /
What accounts for compliance beyond the nation-state? Comparing compliance with regulations that have been formulated in a very similar way at different levels of governance, the authors demonstrate that verification and sanctioning systems seem to be more important than the presence of an agent tha...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Otros Autores: | , |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Cambridge ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2005.
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Colección: | Themes in European governance.
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Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover
- Series-title
- Title
- Copyright
- Contents
- Tables
- Notes on contributors
- Preface
- 1 Introduction: Law and compliance at different levels
- 1.1 The principal contest
- 1.2 Comparing compliance across levels
- 1.2.1 Compliance
- 1.2.2 Similar regulations at different levels
- 1.3 The causes of and cures for non-compliance beyond the nation-state: Four theoretical perspectives
- 1.3.1 Cheating and rational institutionalism
- 1.3.2 Ambiguity and legalization
- 1.3.3 Non-acceptance of rules and legitimacy
- 1.3.4 Resources and management
- 1.4 Empirical and normative results
- 1.4.1 The principal contest who is right?
- 1.4.2 What accounts for compliance beyond the nation-state?
- 1.4.3 Is law beyond the nation-state a valid normative project?
- 1.4.4 How to promote law beyond the nation-state?
- 1.4.5 What is special about the EU?
- 2 The analysis of compliance with international rules: Definitions, variables, and methodology
- 2.1 Introduction: Cross-level comparison
- 2.2 Conceptualizing compliance the dependent variable
- 2.2.1 Non-compliance as the difference between facts and norms
- 2.2.2 Compliance as a process
- 2.3 Conceptualizing the independent variables
- 2.3.1 Rational institutionalism
- 2.3.2 Legalization
- 2.3.3 Legitimacy
- 2.3.4 Management
- 2.4 Perspectives, variables, hypotheses, and values
- 3 State aid control at the national, European, and international level
- 3.1 State aid control regulations and the cases of dispute settlement
- 3.1.1 State aid control at the national level: The co-operation between the German L228;nder
- 3.1.2 State aid control at the European level: The EC Treaty provisions on subsidies control
- 3.1.3 State aid control at the international level: The WTO/GATT provisions on subsidies
- 3.2 The degrees of compliance with the state aid control regulations
- 3.2.1 Compliance with the inter-L228;nder codices in Germany
- 3.2.2 Compliance with the European Regulation
- 3.2.3 Compliance with the WTO/GATT Regulations
- 3.2.4 Comparing the degrees of compliance with state aid rules at the different political levels
- 3.3 The independent variables: Explaining the comparative empirical result
- 3.3.1 Rational institutionalism
- 3.3.2 The legalization approach
- 3.3.3 The legitimacy approach
- 3.3.4 The management approach
- 3.4 Conclusion: Comparing compliance with state aid control regimes at three political levels
- 3.4.1 Summary of the performances of the different theoretical perspectives
- 3.4.2 The compliance perspective: What is so special about European politics?
- 4 Domestic limits of supranational law: Comparing compliance with European and international foodstuffs regulations
- 4.1 Risk regulation in the EU and the WTO
- 4.2 Basic trade rules in the EU and WTO
- 4.3 Compliance with European and WTO rules
- 4.4 Dealing with non-compliance
- 4.4.1 Initial non-compliance in the BSE case
- 4.4.2 Permanent compliance crises in the beef hormones case
- 4.5 Explaining compliance
- 4.5.1 Rational institutionalism
- 4.5.2 Legalization
- 4.5.3 Legitimacy
- 4.5.4 Reflexivity
- 4.6 Explaining non-compliance
- 5 Politics of intergovernmental redistribution: Comparing compliance with European and federal redistributive regulations
- 5.1 Intergovernmental redistribution
- 5.2 Intergovernmental redistribution in the EU and Germany
- 5.2.1 Quantita.