Courts under constraints : judges, generals, and presidents in Argentina /
This study offers a new theoretical framework for understanding how institutional instability affects judicial behavior under dictatorship and democracy. In stark contrast to conventional wisdom, the central findings of the book contradict the longstanding assumption that only independent judges rul...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autor principal: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Cambridge, UK ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2005.
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Colección: | Cambridge studies in comparative politics.
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Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Dedication; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of Tables; List of Figures; Preface and Acknowledgments; 1 Ruling against the Rulers; 2 The Logic of Strategic Defection; 3 A Theory of Court-Executive Relations; 4 Judges, Generals, and Presidents; 5 The Reverse Legal-Political Cycle; 6 The Dynamics of Defection; 7 Conclusion; Appendix A Overview of the Federal Argentine Judiciary and the Argentine Supreme Court; Appendix B The Argentine Supreme Court Decisions Data Set; Appendix C Equilibria Proofs; References; Index.