An essay on the nature and conduct of the passions and affections : with illustrations on the moral sense /
"Francis Hutcheson is one of the central figures in eighteenth-century moral philosophy. Read widely in Britain, France, Germany, and America, he influenced philosophers ranging from his student Adam Smith to Kant. After the initial reaction to his first major work, Inquiry into the Original of...
Clasificación: | Libro Electrónico |
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Autor principal: | |
Autor Corporativo: | |
Formato: | Electrónico eBook |
Idioma: | Inglés |
Publicado: |
Indianapolis :
Liberty Fund,
©2002.
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Colección: | Hutcheson, Francis, 1694-1746. Works. 2002.
Natural law and enlightenment classics. Online library of liberty. |
Temas: | |
Acceso en línea: | Texto completo |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense
- Front Matter
- Title Page
- Copyright Details
- Table of Contents
- Introduction, p. ix
- Acknowledgments, p. xxv
- The Preface, p. 3
- The Contents, p. 13
- Treatise I
- Section I.A General Account of our several Senses and Desires, p. 15
- Section II. Of the Affections and Passions: The natural Laws of pure Affection: The confused Sensations of the Passions, with their final Causes, p. 30
- Section III. Particular Divisions of the Affections and Passions, p. 48 Sections IV. How far our several Affections and Passions are under our Power, either to govern them when raised, or to prevent their arising: with some general Obersvations about their Objects, p. 66
- Section V.A Comparison of the Pleasures and Pains of the several Senses, as to Intenseness and Duration, p. 87
- Section VI. Some general Conclusions concerning the best Management of our Desires. With some Principles necessary to Happiness, p. 110
- Treatise II. Illustrations upon the Moral Sense, p. 133 Section I. Concerning the Character of Virtue, agreeable to Truth or Reason, p. 137
- Section II. Concerning that Character of Virtue and Vice; the Fitness or Unfitness of Actions, p. 155
- Section III. Mr. Woolaston's Significancy of Truth, as the Idea of Virtue, considered, p. 161
- Section IV. Shewing the Use of Reason concerning Virtue and Vice, upon Supposition that we receive these Ideas by a Moral Sense, p. 173
- Section V. Shewing that Virtue may have whatever is meant by Merit.
- And be rewardable upon the Supposition that it is perceived by a Sense, and elected from Affection or Instinct, p. 178 Section VI. How far a Regard to the Deity is necessary to make an Action Virtuous, p. 187
- Textual Notes, p. 205
- Index, p. 221