Consciousness, color, and content /

Experiences and feelings are inherently conscious states. There is something it is like to feel pain, to have an itch, to experience bright red. Philosophers call this sort of consciousness "phenomenal consciousness." Even though phenomenal consciousness seems to be a relatively primitive...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Tye, Michael
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 2000.
©2000
Colección:Representation and mind.
Bradford book.
Temas:
Consciousness.
Color (Philosophy)
Mental representation.
Consciousness
Conscience.
Couleur (Philosophie)
Représentation mentale.
PSYCHOLOGY > Personality.
PHILOSOPHY > Mind & Body.
Bewusstsein
Farbe
Wissensrepräsentation
Filosofie van de geest.
Bewustzijn.
Mentale representatie.
Kleurwaarneming.
CONSCIÊNCIA (PERCEPÇÃO)
COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General
PHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • 1. Knowing what it is like : the ability hypothesis and the knowledge argument
  • 2. The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion
  • 3. Representationalism : the theory and its motivations
  • 4. Blurry images, double vision, and other oddities : new problems for representationalism?
  • 5. On moderation in matters phenomenal : shoemaker and inverted qualia
  • 6. Swampman meets inverted earth
  • 7. On some alleged problems for objectivism about color
  • 8. The problem of simple minds : is there anything it is like to be a honey bee?

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