Appointing central bankers : the politics of monetary policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union /

This book attempts to answer three questions. Do politicians influence monetary policy via Fed appointments? Who influences the process - the President alone or both the President and the Senate? What explains the structure of the Fed appointment process?

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Chang, Kelly H.
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge, U.K. ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Colección:Political economy of institutions and decisions.
Temas:
Economic and Monetary Union.
Federal Reserve banks.
Banks and banking, Central > United States.
Banks and banking, Central > Europe.
Monetary policy > United States.
Monetary policy > Europe.
Banques de la Réserve fédérale.
Banques centrales > États-Unis.
Banques centrales > Europe.
Politique monétaire > États-Unis.
Politique monétaire > Europe.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS > Money & Monetary Policy.
Banks and banking, Central.
Monetary policy.
Centrale banken.
Staatstoezicht.
Benoemingen.
Bankiers.
Europe.
United States.
Acceso en línea:Texto completo
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • A formal model of the appointment process
  • Estimating monetary policy preferences
  • Empirically testing the model's predictions
  • Appointments to the European Central Bank
  • The origins of the Federal Reserve appointment process
  • Conclusions.

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