Cargando…

Anti-individualism and knowledge /

Contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by anti-individualism, which holds that a subject's thoughts are determined not only by what is inside her head but also by aspects of her environment. Despite its dominance, anti-individualism is subject to a daunting array of epistemological object...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Clasificación:Libro Electrónico
Autor principal: Brown, Jessica (Jessica Anne)
Formato: Electrónico eBook
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2004.
Colección:Contemporary philosophical monographs ; 4.
Temas:
Acceso en línea:Texto completo

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a22000004a 4500
001 EBSCO_ocm57141687
003 OCoLC
005 20231017213018.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu|||unuuu
008 041203s2004 mau ob 001 0 eng d
010 |a  2003054115 
040 |a N$T  |b eng  |e pn  |c N$T  |d OCLCQ  |d YDXCP  |d OCLCQ  |d N$T  |d OCLCQ  |d OKU  |d TUU  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCF  |d NLGGC  |d OCLCQ  |d AGLDB  |d IQW  |d OCLCQ  |d WY@  |d LUE  |d VTS  |d MITPR  |d CN4UL  |d STF  |d G3B  |d K6U  |d EBLCP  |d UKSSU  |d UKAHL  |d INARC  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCQ  |d IOY  |d OCLCQ  |d LDP  |d OCLCQ 
019 |a 850214315  |a 1150173174  |a 1154940601  |a 1156874239  |a 1170393402 
020 |a 9780262269346  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 0262269341  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 1417560312  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 9781417560318  |q (electronic bk.) 
020 |a 026252421X 
020 |a 9780262524216 
020 |a 0262025582 
020 |a 9780262025584 
029 1 |a AU@  |b 000051451402 
029 1 |a AU@  |b 000072981749 
029 1 |a DEBBG  |b BV043090874 
029 1 |a DEBSZ  |b 422349380 
029 1 |a GBVCP  |b 801222060 
035 |a (OCoLC)57141687  |z (OCoLC)850214315  |z (OCoLC)1150173174  |z (OCoLC)1154940601  |z (OCoLC)1156874239  |z (OCoLC)1170393402 
037 |a 1294  |b MIT Press 
037 |a 9780262269346  |b MIT Press 
050 4 |a BD161  |b .B765 2004eb 
072 7 |a PHI  |x 004000  |2 bisacsh 
082 0 4 |a 121/.3  |2 22 
049 |a UAMI 
100 1 |a Brown, Jessica  |q (Jessica Anne) 
245 1 0 |a Anti-individualism and knowledge /  |c Jessica Brown. 
260 |a Cambridge, Mass. :  |b MIT Press,  |c ©2004. 
300 |a 1 online resource (xiv, 339 pages) 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a Contemporary philosophical monographs ;  |v 4 
500 |a "A Bradford book." 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 327-334) and index. 
505 0 |a Anti-individualism -- Knowledge and discrimination -- Thought and discriminative abilities: Evans -- The illusion argument -- Anti-individualism and reasoning -- Anti-individualism and Fregean sense -- The reductio argument: transmission of warrant -- The reductio argument: entailments between thought and the world -- Appendix to chapter 8: comparison with Davies and Wright. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
520 |a Contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by anti-individualism, which holds that a subject's thoughts are determined not only by what is inside her head but also by aspects of her environment. Despite its dominance, anti-individualism is subject to a daunting array of epistemological objections: that it is incompatible with the privileged access each subject has to her thoughts, that it undermines rationality, and, absurdly, that it provides a new route to a priori knowledge of the world. In this rigorous and persuasive study, Jessica Brown defends anti-individualism from these epistemological objections. The discussion has important consequences for key epistemological issues such as skepticism, closure, transmission, and the nature of knowledge and warrant. According to Brown's analysis, one main reason for thinking that anti-individualism is incompatible with privileged access is that it undermines a subject's introspective ability to distinguish types of thoughts. So diagnosed, the standard focus on a subject's reliability about her thoughts provides no adequate reply. Brown defuses the objection by appeal to the epistemological notion of a relevant alternative. Further, she argues that, given a proper understanding of rationality, anti-individualism is compatible with the notion that we are rational subjects. However, the discussion of rationality provides a new argument that anti-individualism is in tension with Fregean sense. Finally, Brown shows that anti-individualism does not create a new route to a priori knowledge of the world. While rejecting solutions that restrict the transmission of warrant, she argues that anti-individualists should deny that we have the type of knowledge that would be required to use a priori knowledge of thought content to gain a priori knowledge of the world. 
590 |a eBooks on EBSCOhost  |b EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - Worldwide 
650 0 |a Knowledge, Theory of. 
650 0 |a Individualism. 
650 6 |a Théorie de la connaissance. 
650 7 |a epistemology.  |2 aat 
650 7 |a PHILOSOPHY  |x Epistemology.  |2 bisacsh 
650 7 |a Individualism.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00970328 
650 7 |a Knowledge, Theory of.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00988194 
653 |a COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General 
653 |a PHILOSOPHY/General 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Brown, Jessica.  |t Anti-individualism and knowledge.  |d Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2004  |z 026252421X  |z 0262025582  |w (DLC) 2003054115  |w (OCoLC)52410190 
830 0 |a Contemporary philosophical monographs ;  |v 4. 
856 4 0 |u https://ebsco.uam.elogim.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=122495  |z Texto completo 
938 |a Askews and Holts Library Services  |b ASKH  |n AH37586247 
938 |a ProQuest Ebook Central  |b EBLB  |n EBL5966625 
938 |a EBSCOhost  |b EBSC  |n 122495 
938 |a Internet Archive  |b INAR  |n antiindividualis0000brow 
938 |a YBP Library Services  |b YANK  |n 2353056 
938 |a YBP Library Services  |b YANK  |n 3410913 
994 |a 92  |b IZTAP